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Categorical Exclusions from
Capital Punishment
HOW MANY WRONGS MAKE A RIGHT?
Dora W. Klein†
INTRODUCTION
Plenty is wrong with capital punishment. Even for
people who support the death penalty in principle, many
reasons exist to oppose the actual, real-world operation of this
punishment.1 One well-noted problem is that defendants who
are poor, or black, or whose victims were white, are
disproportionately likely to be sentenced to death.2
†
Assistant Professor, St. Mary’s University School of Law. J.D., Vanderbilt
University Law School; M.A. (Psychology), University of Pennsylvania; B.A.,
Swarthmore College. For helpful comments and conversations, the author thanks
Deborah Denno, Nancy King, Erik Knutsen, Charlene Luke, Thomas Main, Colin
Marks, Greg Mitchell, Suzanna Sherry, Kent Syverud, Priya Travassos, Elizabeth
Trujillo, and Judith Wise. Responsibility for all errors is, of course, the author’s alone.
1
People who for pragmatic reasons oppose the death penalty comprise a
growing segment of the abolitionist movement:

A new group of abolitionists is emerging. These new abolitionists are not
particularly interested in the philosophical, theoretical, or theological debate
about the propriety of capital punishment. Rather, they have concluded that
regardless of whether one believes that the government has the right to take
life as an abstract matter, one cannot support the death penalty given the
practical issues surrounding the unfairness and inaccuracy of its
implementation.
Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. LAW 573, 576 (2004); see also Louis D. Bilionis, The Unusualness of Capital
Punishment, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 601, 601 (2000) (noting that current “public criticism
does not dwell on the morality of the death penalty as an abstract concept, but instead
raises sharp questions about the fundamental justice of the death penalty as a real,
operating social institution”).
2
The seminal article on indigent capital defendants’ attorneys is Stephen B.
Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the
Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994) (“Poor people accused of capital crimes
are often defended by lawyers who lack the skills, resources, and commitment to
handle such serious matters. . . . It is not the facts of the crime, but the quality of legal
representation, that distinguishes this case, where the death penalty was imposed,
from many similar cases, where it was not.” (footnotes omitted)). For more recent
scholarship on indigent defense, see Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense
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Additionally, commentators have observed that appellate
consideration of death sentences suffers from both too much
emphasis on procedural rules and too little opportunity for
meaningful review.3 Moreover, the Supreme Court has insisted
Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 265 (2004) (“Year
after year, in study after study, observers find remarkably poor defense lawyering that
remains unchanged by this constitutional doctrine [established by Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)],
and they point to lack of funding as the major obstacle to quality defense lawyering.”);
Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent
Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1731 (2005) (“Many courts have been
hesitant to acknowledge the ways in which the realities of indigent defense affect the
assistance a defendant actually receives.”).
Concerning race and the death penalty, perhaps the most (in)famous
consideration of this issue is the Supreme Court’s decision in McClesky v. Kemp. 481
U.S. 279 (1987). In this case, the Court accepted as valid several findings of “the
Baldus study,” including that “defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3
times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing blacks”
and that “black defendants were 1.1 times as likely to receive a death sentence as other
defendants.” Id. at 287. The Court nevertheless rejected McClesky’s equal protection
claim because he failed to prove that “race was a factor in [his] particular case.” Id. at
308; see also David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An
Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983)
(presenting the study’s full data). For recent discussions of race and the death penalty,
see David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Legitimacy of
Capital Punishment: Reflections on the Interaction of Fact and Perception, 53 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1411, 1423-26 (2004) (discussing race-of-defendant and race-of-victim effects);
Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Impact of Legally Inappropriate Factors on
Death Sentencing for California Homicides, 1990-1999, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 1925 (2005) (discussing the greater likelihood of receiving a death sentence for the
murder of a white victim than for the murder of an African American or Hispanic
victim); see also Nancy J. King, How Different is Death? Jury Sentencing in Capital and
Non-Capital Cases Compared, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 195, 204 (2004) (“There is
considerable support for the claim that those who kill white victims are more likely to
receive a death sentence than similarly situated murderers who kill non-white victims,
although several studies suggest that the race of either the defendant or the victim
may carry less significance for the jury’s sentencing decision than it does for the
prosecutor’s charging and bargaining decisions.”).
3
See, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffmann, Is Innocence Sufficient? An Essay on the
U.S. Supreme Court’s Continuing Problems with Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death
Penalty, 68 IND. L.J. 817, 818 (1993) (calling “misguided” the Supreme Court’s
“jurisprudential choice to treat the Eighth Amendment as a ‘super due process clause,’
rather than as an invitation for the federal courts to review the merits of individual
state-imposed death sentences” (footnote omitted)); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M.
Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional
Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 403 (1995) [hereinafter
Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts] (concluding that the Supreme Court’s death
penalty decisions “have produced a complicated regulatory apparatus that achieves
extremely modest goals with a maximum amount of political and legal discomfort”);
Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital
Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 794 (2002) (“An array of
procedural barriers to habeas corpus review has been crafted carefully, while basic
questions of fairness and justice go unexamined. Although it would be comforting to
believe that habeas corpus and other court processes guard against unjust executions,
the sad reality is that the review procedures in capital cases are unmoored by any
enduring commitment to heightened scrutiny or careful deliberation.”).
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that only “the worst of the worst” may be executed for their
crimes,4 yet the Court has provided little guidance about what
exactly ought to qualify someone for inclusion in this
supposedly select group of death penalty-eligible offenders.5
This failure to articulate any defining principles for the “worst
of the worst” category of offenders has allowed legislatures to
enact death penalty statutes that are so encompassing as to not
really limit eligibility for this punishment at all.6 And in the
past thirty years, the convictions of dozens of people on death
row have been reversed,7 raising the distinct possibility that an
4
See Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2543 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(stating that “within the category of capital crimes, the death penalty must be reserved
for “the worst of the worst’” (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005)));
Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (“Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders who
commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability
makes them ‘the most deserving of execution’” (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 319 (2002))); see also Dean A. Strang, The Rhetoric of Death, 1998 WIS. L. REV.
841, 853 (describing “the Court’s insistence” that capital sentencing schemes ensure
that death “is reserved for the worst of the worst”); Penny J. White, Can Lightning
Strike Twice? Obligations of State Courts After Pulley v. Harris, 70 U. COLO. L. REV.
813, 866 (1999) (“[T]he Court assumed that by appropriately narrowing death
eligibility . . . the death penalty could adequately be reserved for the ‘worst of the
worst.’”); Note, The Rhetoric of Difference and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment,
114 HARV. L. REV. 1599, 1604 n.40 (2001) (“Like the phrase ‘death is different,’ ‘the
worst of the worst’ peppers death penalty literature.” (citing Irene Merker Rosenberg &
Yale L. Rosenberg, Lone Star Liberal Musings on “Eye for Eye” and the Death Penalty,
1998 UTAH L. REV. 505, 524 (“The capital punishment schemes in this country purport
to recognize that only the worst of the worst should receive the death penalty.”)).
5
See Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure: From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV.
359, 409 n.256 (2001) (“The Supreme Court has not required significant narrowing and
has not suggested that the narrowing must build on any particular substantive
theory.”).
6
See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The
Paradox of Today’s Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 391 (1998) (“The Supreme Court’s failure to require state
legislatures and courts to develop clear lines has resulted in the modern arbitrary use
of capital punishment.”); Jonathan Simon & Christina Spaulding, Tokens of Our
Esteem: Aggravating Factors in the Era of Deregulated Death Penalties, in THE KILLING
STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE 82 (Austin Sarat ed.,
1999) (“[N]ew aggravating circumstances have been added to capital statutes, like
Christmas tree ornaments. These new factors reveal a process self-consciously freed
from the dictates of substantive Supreme Court review.”); Steiker & Steiker, Sober
Second Thoughts, supra note 3, at 373 (“[T]he Court has approved aggravating
circumstances that arguably encompass every murder, such as Arizona’s circumstance
that asks whether the defendant committed the offense in an ‘especially heinous, cruel
or depraved manner’ and Idaho’s circumstance that asks whether ‘[b]y the murder, or
circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter disregard for
human life.’” (footnotes omitted)).
7
See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989
Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 529 (2005) (reporting seventy-four
exonerations of death-row prisoners between 1989 and 2003); Steven J. Mulroy, The
Safety Net: Applying Coram Nobis Law to Prevent the Execution of the Innocent, 11 VA.
J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 3 (2003) (“Since 1973, 111 persons sentenced to death have been
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innocent person might someday be—or might already have
been—executed.8
Given such wrongs, it is tempting to regard as right any
court decision that limits capital punishment’s reach. Less of a
bad thing is, all else being equal, a good thing. What if,
however, a capital punishment-limiting decision possesses
wrongs of its own? Two recent Supreme Court decisions, Roper
v. Simmons and Atkins v. Virginia, raise this very question.9
Both decisions limit the death penalty—Roper excludes from
this punishment offenders who committed their crimes before
they were eighteen years old and Atkins excludes offenders who
are mentally retarded. But in both cases, the Supreme Court
overstated the uniformity and universality of traits associated
with diminished culpability among juvenile and mentally
retarded offenders.10 Contrary to the impression the Court
conveys in Atkins and Roper, not all offenders whom these
decisions exclude from the death penalty are necessarily less
culpable for their crimes than are the offenders who remain
subject to this punishment.
Do the wrongs of capital punishment nevertheless make
the Court’s decisions in Atkins and Roper right? This Article
proposes that answering this question requires considering the
implications not only for the offenders whom these decisions
exclude from capital punishment but also for those offenders
who are still included. While Roper and Atkins quite clearly

released because of factual innocence.” (footnote omitted)). Additionally, the Death
Penalty Information Center maintains a list of exonerations. Death Penalty Info. Ctr.,
Innocence and the Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?
did=412&scid=6 (last visited Mar. 27, 2007) (“Since 1973, 123 people in 25 states have
been released from death row with evidence of their innocence.”).
8
This possibility, even more than any of the other problems, seems to be
especially alarming for death penalty supporters. For example, in 2000, Illinois
Governor George Ryan imposed a moratorium on executions in part because of his
state’s “troubling track record of exonerating more Death Row inmates than it has
executed.” Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, Governor to Halt Executions, CHI. TRIB., Jan.
30, 2000, at 1, cited in Stevenson, supra note 3, at 372 n.146; see also Samuel R. Gross,
Update: American Public Opinion on the Death Penalty—It’s Getting Personal, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1448, 1462 (1998) (citing evidence that “the risk of executing innocent
defendants is important because it is persuasive to those who generally favor the death
penalty”).
9
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002).
10
Roper, 543 U.S. at 571 (referring to “the diminished culpability of
juveniles”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 (“the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded
offender”). For a critique of the Court’s consideration of juvenile and mentally retarded
offenders’ culpability, see infra Part I.A.
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affect juvenile and mentally retarded offenders,11 that these
decisions also affect non-juvenile and non-mentally retarded
offenders is not so obvious. This Article proposes, though, that
Roper and Atkins do affect these still-included offenders, in
ways that lend support to the adage about two wrongs not
making a right. As substantial as the wrongs of capital
punishment are, they might not excuse the wrongs of
categorical exclusions from capital punishment.12
Part I begins with a discussion of the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Atkins and Roper. The key problem in these
decisions is the Court’s failure to recognize categorical
exclusions’ implications for non-juvenile and non-mentally
retarded offenders.13 Because not all offenders who after Atkins
and Roper are ineligible for the death penalty are necessarily
less culpable than those who may still be sentenced to death,
the categorical exclusions allow for the unequally severe
punishment of equally culpable offenders.14 These unequal
sentences are unjust, and—because they are based on factors
only imperfectly related to culpability—they are also
arbitrary.15
Additionally, in the twenty states that prior to Atkins
and Roper had included juvenile and mentally retarded
offenders among those who could be sentenced to death, the
Court’s decisions might render the death sentences of nonjuvenile and non-mentally retarded offenders more severe than
those states’ legislatures had intended.16 These sentences
might be more severe for two reasons. First, had a legislature
known when it enacted its death penalty scheme that not all
offenders whom it considered potentially deserving of the death
penalty could receive this sentence, it might have chosen to

11

The effect of Roper on juvenile offenders is easy to identify—after Roper,
the death penalty is an unconstitutional punishment for crimes committed by those
who are not yet eighteen years old. Identifying the effect of Atkins on mentally
retarded offenders is superficially as easy—after Atkins, the death penalty is an
unconstitutional punishment for crimes committed by those who are mentally
retarded. But as is discussed in detail in Part I, determining whether an offender is
mentally retarded is vastly harder than determining whether he is eighteen years old.
See also infra note 161 and accompanying text.
12
This caution is meant to apply only to categorical exclusions that are based
on imperfect correlations with culpability. See infra notes 21-27 and accompanying
text.
13
See infra Part I.A.
14
See infra Part I.B.1.
15
See infra Part I.B.2.
16
See infra Part I.B.3.
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enact a different scheme.17 And second, if only some offenders
who deserve a punishment actually receive it, then the
offenders who are punished are treated as more blameworthy
than the legislature had considered them to be.18
Part II discusses the effects of Atkins and Roper in the
context of the broader capital punishment system. Numerous
scholars—and on occasion a few members of the Supreme
Court as well—have noted the difficulty, if not impossibility, of
achieving both fairness in individual capital sentences and
consistency among sentences.19 To the extent that categorical
exclusions prevent the death penalty from being imposed when
a juvenile or a mentally retarded offender is not so culpable as
to deserve this punishment, the decisions in Atkins and Roper
promote both of these capital-punishment sentencing goals.
But by excluding from the death penalty even those juvenile
and mentally retarded offenders who are as culpable as the
non-juvenile and non-mentally retarded offenders who may be
sentenced to death, the decisions in Atkins and Roper allow
unfairness in individual sentences and inconsistency across
sentences.20 Moreover, because neither decision addresses even
the possibility that categorical exclusions will diminish fairness
and consistency, Atkins and Roper create a false sense that the
justness of capital punishment has only been enhanced. This
Article concludes that although the many wrongs of capital
punishment provide strong motivation for believing that the
Atkins and Roper decisions are right, the rightness of these
decisions becomes far from certain when the consequences for
non-excluded offenders are considered. Capital punishment
after Atkins and Roper might appear to be more just, but this
appearance might be misleading.
I.

THE MISSTEPS OF ATKINS AND ROPER

A.

From Imperfect Correlations to Categorical Exclusions

In Atkins and Roper, the Supreme Court justified
categorically excluding certain offenders from the death
penalty on the basis of those offenders’ diminished culpability,
yet defined the categories of offenders to be excluded—juvenile
17
18
19
20

See infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 131-43 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.B.
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and mentally retarded offenders—in terms of characteristics—
age and mental abilities—that are only imperfectly related to
culpability.21 A person’s level of culpability for a given act is
most directly a function of the mental state that accompanied
the act, not of age or cognitive abilities.22 Certainly, age and
21
This Article assumes, without necessarily endorsing, the same culpabilitybased, retributivist rationale for the death penalty as has the Supreme Court. See
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461 (1984) (stating that retributivism is the
“primary justification of the death penalty”); Richard S. Murphy, Comment, The
Significance of Victim Harm: Booth v. Maryland and the Philosophy of Punishment in
the Supreme Court, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1303, 1333 (1988) (“[T]he Court’s approach to
punishment, at least in the death penalty context, is essentially retributive despite
protestations to the contrary.”); cf. Austin Sarat, Putting a Square Peg in a Round
Hole: Victims, Retribution, and George Ryan’s Clemency, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1350
(2004) (“Modern legality is founded on an effort to make reason triumph over emotion
and to make punishments proportional in their severity to the crimes that occasion
them. Just deserts, not deterrence or rehabilitation, becomes the primary, if not the
sole, norm governing punishment.” (footnotes omitted)).
This Article does not address either deterrence or incapacitation, the two
other commonly invoked rationales for capital punishment, because whether an
offender is mentally retarded or a juvenile cannot affect the legitimacy of either
rationale. If incapacitation is a legitimate reason to sentence anyone to death, then it
is a legitimate reason to sentence a mentally retarded or juvenile offender to death—
the mentally retarded or juvenile offender will be just as incapacitated as any nonmentally retarded or non-juvenile offender. Similarly, if deterrence is a legitimate
reason for sentencing a non-mentally retarded or non-juvenile offender to death, then it
is a legitimate reason for sentencing a mentally retarded or juvenile offender to death.
In Atkins and Roper, the Court argued that the deterability (or lack thereof) of
mentally retarded and juvenile offenders supported categorically excluding them from
capital punishment. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (“As for deterrence, it
is unclear whether the death penalty has a significant or even measurable deterrent
effect on juveniles, as counsel for the petitioner acknowledged at oral argument.”);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319-20 (2002) (“Exempting the mentally retarded
from [capital] punishment will not affect the ‘cold calculus that precedes the decision’ of
other potential murderers. Indeed, that sort of calculus is at the opposite end of the
spectrum from behavior of mentally retarded offenders.” (citation omitted)). But the
Court’s arguments mostly miss the real point of the deterrence rationale, which is that
the death penalty deters other people from committing crimes. Thus the issue is not
whether mentally retarded or juvenile offenders can be deterred but whether executing
them can deter other people from committing crimes. There seems to be no reason to
believe that the deterrent effect (if any) of the death penalty on potential murderers is
at all influenced by whether some of those who have received death sentences are
mentally retarded or juvenile offenders.
22
See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987) (“A critical facet of the
individualized determination of culpability required in capital cases is the mental state
with which the defendant commits the crime. Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is
the idea that the more purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the
offense, and, therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished.”); Larry Alexander,
Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV.
931, 953 (2000) (“Criminal culpability is always a function of what the actor believes
regarding the nature and consequences of his conduct and what the actor’s reasons are
for acting as he does in light of those beliefs.”); Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy:
The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 800 (1985) (“Both the law
and lay judgments individuate an actor’s culpability according to the mental states
that accompany actions.”).
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cognitive abilities, along with many other aspects of a person’s
background, might influence culpability, especially penaltyphase culpability.23 What is difficult to determine, though, is
the point at which these aspects actually, rather than merely
potentially, influence culpability. While capacity for culpability
undoubtedly does tend to increase with both age and cognitive
ability, at least up until a certain threshold, there is no single
point on either the age or cognitive ability spectrum that
divides all those who are capable of a particular level of
culpability from all those who are not.24 Simply put, neither
age nor mental ability correlates perfectly with capacity for
culpability.
In Roper, the Court seemed to recognize on some level
the imperfect relationship between age and culpability,25
acknowledging at least a theoretical possibility that some
juvenile offenders might act with death penalty-level

23
See Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What
Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1562 (1998) (suggesting that in capital
cases “‘remote’ reduced culpability . . . focuses on the defendant’s character. It includes
such things as abuse as a child and other deprivations that may have helped shape the
defendant into the kind of person for whom a capital crime was a conceivable course of
action.”); Jordan M. Steiker, The Limits of Legal Language: Decisionmaking in Capital
Cases, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2590, 2622 n.134 (1996) (proposing that sentencing-phase
jurors in capital cases should be instructed “to consider not only the circumstances
surrounding the crime, but also aspects of the defendant’s character, background, and
capabilities that bear on his culpability for the crime”).
24
See Donald N. Bersoff, The Differing Conceptions of Culpability in Law and
Psychology, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 83, 91 (2004) (“IQ, after all, is not the factor that
renders the imposition of the death penalty against those with mental retardation
unjust. Rather, IQ is a proxy, an imperfect one at that, for a combination of factors,
such as maturity, judgment, and the capability of assessing the consequences of one’s
conduct, that determines the relative culpability of a mentally retarded killer.”);
Stephen J. Morse, Not So Hard (And Not So Special), After All: Comments On
Zimring’s ‘The Hardest of the Hard Cases,’ 6 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 471, 484-85 (1999)
(“Adolescents as a class may be more developmentally malleable or amenable to
treatment than adults, but then amenability or malleability, not age, is the operative
variable.”).
This lack of a perfect dividing point means that some juvenile and
mentally retarded offenders will fall on the sufficiently culpable end of the culpability
spectrum and also that some non-juvenile and non-mentally retarded offenders will fall
on the not sufficiently culpable end. This Article focuses on the first group of offenders,
because those in the second group already have an independently valid claim against a
death sentence (the claim that they are not sufficiently culpable). The concern in this
Article is the effect that categorically excluding the first group will have on the
sentences of yet a third group, those non-juvenile and non-mentally retarded offenders
who also fall on the sufficiently culpable end of the culpability spectrum.
25
Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 (“The qualities that distinguish juveniles from
adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token, some under
18 have already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach.”).
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culpability.26 In Atkins, though, the Court seemed to declare
that for cognitive ability, a perfect dividing point does exist,
such that all people who fall on the mentally retarded end of
the cognitive ability spectrum are incapable of acting with a
level of culpability that might warrant capital punishment.27
Two problems exist with this declaration that not a
single person with mental retardation can commit a capital
crime with the same level of culpability as someone without
mental retardation. First, it is not supported by the available
mental retardation research, as a close look at the sources the
Court cited in the Atkins decision reveals.28 Additionally, by
failing to acknowledge the possibility that some mentally
retarded offenders might act with death penalty-level
culpability, the Court makes the task of administering a capital
punishment system in a way that is both fair29 and consistent30
seem simpler than it really is. Categorical exclusions might
solve the problem of improperly sentenced mentally retarded or
juvenile offenders, but they raise other problems, problems
that the Court in Roper failed to consider and that under
Atkins, the Court could not possibly have considered because
accepting the Court’s reasoning means denying that these
problems even exist.
1. Atkins v. Virginia
In Atkins, the Supreme Court declared that for anyone
who satisfies one of several commonly accepted clinical
definitions of mental retardation,31 a death sentence is cruel
26
Id. at 572 (“Certainly it can be argued, although we by no means concede
the point, that a rare case might arise in which a juvenile offender has sufficient
psychological maturity, and at the same time demonstrates sufficient depravity, to
merit a sentence of death.”).
27
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002) (“Those mentally retarded
persons who meet the law’s requirements for criminal responsibility should be tried
and punished when they commit crimes. Because of their disabilities in areas of
reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses, however, they do not act with the
level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct.”);
id. at 318 (“[The] deficiencies [of mentally retarded persons] do not warrant an
exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability.”).
28
See infra Part I.A.1.
29
Fairness refers to noncomparative justice—does a particular defendant
deserve, in an absolute sense, the death penalty? This concept is discussed in more
detail infra note 127.
30
Consistency means that similarly culpable offenders receive similarly
severe sentences. See sources cited infra note 127.
31
It is curious that the Court adopted a clinical approach to defining the
concept of mental retardedation, given that it has chosen not to define similar concepts,
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and unusual punishment.32 The Court based its decision on
two conclusions: that a national consensus exists against
sentencing mentally retarded offenders to death,33 and that
people who are mentally retarded all possess certain
psychological characteristics that render them incapable of
acting with the same level of culpability as people who are not
mentally retarded.34
A discussion of whether the Court correctly assessed the
national attitude regarding the death penalty for people who
are mentally retarded is beyond this Article’s scope.35 But even
such as insanity and competence to stand trial, in clinical, mental illness terms. See
GERALD C. DAVISON & JOHN M. NEALE, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 536 (8th ed. 2001)
(“Insanity is a legal concept, not a psychiatric or psychological concept.”); Dora W.
Klein, Note, Trial Rights and Psychotropic Drugs: The Case Against Administering
Involuntary Medications to a Defendant During Trial, 55 VAND. L. REV. 165, 167 n.8
(2002) (“Incompetence to stand trial is not synonymous with mental illness; a person
can be mentally ill, yet still competent to stand trial.” (citing Lee v. Alabama, 406 F.2d
466, 471-72 (5th Cir. 1968))); see also Lee, 406 F.2d at 471-72 (“One may be suffering
from a mental disease . . . and simultaneously have a rational and factual
understanding of court proceedings and be able to consult with a lawyer on a
reasonably rational basis.” (citations omitted)).
32
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (concluding that execution of offenders who are
mentally retarded is excessive).
33
Id. at 314 (discussing state legislatures).
34
Id. at 319-20 (discussing Court’s agreement with the legislative consensus
because of the “deficiencies” of people who are mentally retarded).
35
In Atkins as well as Roper, dissenting opinions argued that this consensus
was not so much a reality as a product of the Court’s clever counting. See id. at 342
(“The Court . . . miraculously extracts a ‘national consensus’ forbidding execution of the
mentally retarded from the fact that 18 States—less than half (47%) of the 38 States
that permit capital punishment (for whom the issue exists)—have very recently
enacted legislation barring execution of the mentally retarded.”) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
By Roper, Justice Scalia was apoplectic over the counting issue:
Consulting States that bar the death penalty concerning the necessity of
making an exception to the penalty for offenders under 18 is rather like
including old-order Amishmen in a consumer-preference poll on the electric
car. Of course they don’t like it, but that sheds no light whatever on the point
at issue. That 12 States favor no executions says something about consensus
against the death penalty, but nothing—absolutely nothing—about consensus
that offenders under 18 deserve special immunity from such a
penalty. . . . The attempt by the Court to turn its remarkable minority
consensus into a faux majority by counting Amishmen is an act of
nomological desperation.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 610-11 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
But granting that some number of states prohibited the execution of
juvenile and mentally retarded offenders, and also that even in states that did not
expressly prohibit them such executions were uncommon, the question remains what
kind of national consensus this evidence might establish. Thus, even if the Court was
correct that some kind of national consensus existed regarding the execution of juvenile
and mentally retarded offenders, it is nonetheless still possible that the Court erred in
concluding that a national consensus existed that juvenile and mentally retarded
offenders are necessarily incapable of acting with the kind of culpability that would
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assuming that the Court’s assessment of a national consensus
against such punishment was correct, the Atkins decision is
still troubling because of the Court’s assertions about the
relationship between a diagnosis of mental retardation and the
capacity for culpability.36
a. Mental Retardation “By Definition”
In explaining its decision to exclude all people with
mental retardation from the death penalty, the Atkins Court
asserted that “by definition [mentally retarded persons] have
diminished capacities to understand and process information,
to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses,
and to understand the reactions of others.”37 A diagnosis of
mental retardation does not, however, “by definition”
necessarily include impairments in the particular skills the
Court listed.
Currently, the two most commonly used
definitions of mental retardation are the definition adopted by
the American Psychiatric Association38 and the definition
adopted by the American Association of Mental Retardation.39
justify the death penalty. See Leading Cases, 116 HARV. L. REV. 200, 226-27 n.65
(2002) (noting that in Atkins “the Court [did not] cite any legislative history supporting
its view that the reduced culpability justification was the moral impetus for the state
bans”).
36
Cf. Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, The Camel’s Nose Is in the
Tent: Rules, Theories, and Slippery Slopes, 51 UCLA L. REV. 539, 579-80 n.107 (2003)
(observing that “the underlying theory about why mental retardation is relevant in a
criminal context is . . . vague”).
37
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
38
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 49 (4th ed. text revision 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. Under the APA
definition,
The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by
significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following
skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills,
use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work,
leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before age 18
years (Criterion C).
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3.
39
AM. ASS’N OF MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION,
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (10th ed. 2002) [hereinafter AAMR
DEFINITION 2002]. Under the AAMR definition, mental retardation “is a disability
characterized by significant limitations in both intellectual functioning and in adaptive
behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills. This
disability originates before age 18.” Id. The current AAMR definition differs
somewhat from the AAMR definition that was in effect when the Supreme Court
decided Atkins. Under that definition, mental retardation “is characterized by
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Although these two definitions differ slightly, both regard
mental retardation as a syndrome characterized by three kinds
of symptoms: subaverage intellectual functioning, limitations
in some number of adaptive skills, and onset before
adulthood.40 A person diagnosed with mental retardation
might—but also might not—suffer from one or more of the
specific “diminished capacities” on the Court’s list. The only
feature, though, that people with mental retardation
necessarily have in common is that an examiner has concluded
that each meets the criteria of some definition of mental
retardation.
Contrary to the Atkins Court’s repeated
references to “their impairments”41 and “their deficiencies,”42
people who have been diagnosed with mental retardation do
not uniformly exhibit any particular behavioral characteristics
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related
limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas:
communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction,
health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation
manifests before age 18.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3.
40
As the Court summarized, “clinical definitions of mental retardation
require not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in
adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction that became
manifest before age 18.” Id. at 318.
The Court seemed oddly untroubled about—or perhaps just unaware of—
the instability of these definitions. But clinical definitions of mental retardation
change rather often. In 2002, following Atkins, the AAMR revised its diagnostic
criteria, emphasizing consideration of deficits in adaptive behaviors. Some changes
have been more dramatic—in 1973, for example, the AAMR changed the definition of
subaverage intelligence from an IQ score one standard deviation below the mean (85)
to an IQ score two standard deviations below the mean (70). See Sharon Landesman &
Craig Ramey, Developmental Psychology and Mental Retardation: Integrating Scientific
Principles with Treatment Practices, 44 AM. PSYCHOL. 409, 409 (1989) (“What is well
accepted within the field of mental retardation, but often viewed as surprising to those
outside it, is that mental retardation is an arbitrarily defined diagnostic category,
which has changed frequently and substantively over the years.”).
Moreover,
definitions of mental retardation change not because of new scientific discoveries but
because of new political values:
The process of defining mental retardation is essentially an exercise in public
policy. There is no single God-given definition that scientists can discover
and present as the “true” definition. . . . Prior to the new AAMR definition,
scientists had already produced eight different AAMR definitions of mental
retardation. . . . Each of the prior eight definitions had significant
implications for people in terms of service models, stigmatization, and
segregation. The task of developing the ninth AAMR definition was
essentially one of selecting from a range of possibilities the language and
concepts that might serve as the cornerstone of today’s public policy.
Steven Reiss, Issues in Defining Mental Retardation, 99 AM. J. MENTAL RETARDATION
1, 5 (1994) (discussing the next-to-the-most-recent change in the AAMR’s definition of
mental retardation).
41
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306, 318, 320.
42
Id. at 305, 318.
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or personality traits. As the American Psychiatric Association
stresses in its diagnostic manual, “No specific personality and
behavioral features are uniquely associated with Mental
Retardation. Some individuals with Mental Retardation are
passive, placid and dependent, whereas others can be
aggressive and impulsive.”43
b. The Atkins Court’s Sources
The Court provides citations for two of its statements
proposing that people diagnosed with mental retardation
necessarily possess certain psychological traits. In the first of
these, the Court stated: “[B]y definition [mentally retarded
persons] have diminished capacities to understand and process
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and
learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control
impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.”44 The
Court then cited two sources to support this statement: a book
chapter discussing the evaluation of mentally retarded
criminal defendants45 and an article summarizing the
difficulties faced by mentally retarded criminal defendants.46
The book chapter covers a wide range of topics, from
“understanding mental retardation” to “the role of families,
43
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 38, at 44. Steven Reiss, a professor of psychology
and psychiatry at Ohio State University, similarly writes:

Over the years, scientists have proposed various maladaptive traits to be
characteristic of mental retardation.
These include cognitive rigidity,
neuroticism, excessive attention seeking, and disassociation between verbal
and motor systems. Generally, researchers have failed to confirm theories
holding that a specific trait is characteristic of all or most people with mental
retardation. Instead, researchers have found vast individual differences in
behavior among persons with mental retardation.
Steven Reiss, A Mindful Approach to Mental Retardation, 56 J. SOC. ISSUES 65, 73
(2000) (citations omitted); see also Alfred A Baumeister, Mental Retardation: Some
Conceptions and Dilemmas, 42 AM. PSYCHOL. 796, 797 (1987) (“[M]entally retarded
subjects grouped homogeneously with respect to IQ exhibit significantly more betweenindividual differences on various tasks than do similarly grouped nonretarded subjects.
To add more complexity, retarded individuals typically show greater within-subject
variability than nonhandicapped individuals.”).
44
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
45
Id. at 318 n.23 (citing John J. McGee & Frank J. Menolascino, The
Evaluation of Defendants with Mental Retardation in the Criminal Justice System, in
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND MENTAL RETARDATION 55, 58-60 (R. Conley, R.
Luckasson & G. Bouthilet eds., 1992)).
46
Id. (citing Kenneth L. Appelbaum & Paul S. Appelbaum, Criminal-Justice
Related Competencies in Defendants with Mental Retardation, 22 J. PSYCHIATRY & L.
483, 487-89 (1994)).
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guardians, and advocates.”47 The specific pages the Court
referenced discuss three topics, each in a single paragraph:
“cognition and decision making,” “cognition and social
understanding,” and “cognition and moral reasoning.”48 Given
the brief treatment of these topics, the superficiality of the
discussion is not surprising. For example, the authors state
that “[i]ndividuals with mental retardation have rigid thought
processes that lead to a difficulty or failure to learn from
mistakes, resulting in counterproductive behaviors.”49 This
statement, which is not supported by any citations, is followed
by speculation—again unsupported—that “[p]ossible reasons
for this rigidity and persistence center on a limited repertoire
of social and communication skills.”50 At best, this source helps
establish that mentally retarded defendants as a group tend to
exhibit certain traits, such as limited communication skills or
difficulty learning from mistakes. While the chapter’s authors
likely approve of the Atkins decision,51 the chapter itself fails to
support the Atkins Court’s contention that “by definition” all
people diagnosed with mental retardation possess these traits.
The second source, an article published in an
interdisciplinary law and psychiatry journal, similarly presents
a general overview of the characteristics of people diagnosed
with mental retardation.52 As a whole, the cited paper might
serve as a useful introduction to or review of the varying
competencies of people diagnosed with mental retardation, but
it does not provide a basis for concluding that certain
psychological traits of people who are mentally retarded are
uniformly and universally different from the traits of people
who are not mentally retarded. The particular pages the
47
John J. McGee & Frank J. Menolascino, The Evaluation of Defendants with
Mental Retardation in the Criminal Justice System, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
AND MENTAL RETARDATION 55, 58-60 (R. Conley, R. Luckasson, & G. Bouthilet eds.,
1992).
48
Id.
49
Id. at 58.
50
Id.
51
The chapter presents, for example, under a section headed
“Recommendations,” in which the authors present what they describe as the “research
and programmatic support systems [that] need to be initiated and established within
the social fabric of the United States if justice is to be granted to persons with mental
retardation,” the item, “Abolition of the death penalty as a politically symbolic act
congruent with basic human rights and the highest expression of a culture of life.”
McGee & Menolascino, supra note 47, at 71-72.
52
See Kenneth L. Appelbaum & Paul S. Appelbaum, Criminal-JusticeRelated Competencies in Defendants with Mental Retardation, 14 J. PSYCHIATRY & L.
483, 487-89 (1994).
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Atkins Court cited do include such statements as “Many
persons with mental retardation have communication
problems,”53 and “Some persons with mental retardation
exhibit an increased tendency toward passivity or
These statements’ qualifiers—”many,”
helplessness.”54
“some”—implicitly contradict the Supreme Court’s contention
that all people with mental retardation possess certain
psychological or behavioral traits. And while these statements
are supported by citations, the sources that are cited present
For
results that possess only limited generalizability.55
example, the statement “Among people with mental
retardation, appropriate responsiveness decreases as the
complexity of the question increases,”56 is supported with a
citation to a single study, which examined the extent to which
subjects responded appropriately (defined as providing relevant
but not necessarily truthful answers) to different kinds of
questions (yes-no, multiple choice, and open-ended) posed by an
examiner.57 This study found that “[r]etarded persons achieve
moderate success in answering either-or questions” and “have
their greatest difficulty with open-ended questions and with
verbal multiple choice questions.”58 These results do support
the study’s conclusion that framing questions in a certain way
is likely to increase a mentally retarded person’s
responsiveness in an interview setting.59 The results do not,
however, support the Atkins Court’s contentions that people
diagnosed with mental retardation necessarily have a
diminished ability to communicate. Indeed, even though in
this study open-ended and verbal multiple choice questions
produced the lowest mean percentage of appropriate responses,
as compared to the other kinds of questions, mentally retarded
adults responded appropriately to these kinds of questions
more than fifty percent of the time.60 Moreover, all of the
53

Id. at 487.
Id. at 489.
55
This statement is not meant as a criticism of the paper or of the sources it
cited, only of the Atkins Court’s use of the paper to support statements that are more
general than warranted.
56
Appelbaum & Appelbaum, supra note 52, at 487.
57
Carol K. Sigelman, Jane L. Winer & Carol J. Shoenrock, The
Responsiveness of Mentally Retarded Persons to Questions, 17 EDUC. & TRAINING
MENTALLY RETARDED 120, 120-24 (1982), cited in Appelbaum & Appelbaum, supra
note 52, at 499 n.30.
58
Sigelman, Winer & Shoenrock, supra note 57, at 123
59
Id. at 124.
60
Id. at 123.
54
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study’s adult subjects were institutionalized and many were
diagnosed with moderate or severe mental retardation,61
suggesting that they were, as a group, far more impaired than
anyone who is at all likely to be convicted of a capital crime.62
The Atkins Court, in the second sentence devoted to
supporting
its
position
that
certain
psychological
characteristics of people who are mentally retarded render
them incapable of acting with death penalty-level culpability,
stated: “[T]here is abundant evidence that [mentally retarded
persons] often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a
premeditated plan, and that in group settings they are
followers rather than leaders.”63 In support of this statement,
the Court cited four sources: a law review article64 and three
articles from social science journals discussing three particular
psychological characteristics—ego identity, self regulation, and
competency to confess.65
The law review article presents a thoughtful discussion
of the difficulties that certain aspects of the criminal law often
pose for defendants who are mentally retarded, especially as
distinguished from the particular difficulties that defendants
who are mentally ill often experience.66 The article also
includes some general, although carefully qualified, statements
61

Id. at 121 (describing adult sample as consisting of “42 institutionalized
adults in the severe to mild ranges of retardation”). The sample subjects’ mean IQ was
39.76 with a standard deviation of 13.12. Id. An IQ level of 35-40 defines the
boundary between moderate and severe mental retardation. See DSM-IV-TR, supra
note 38, at 49.
62
Simply as a matter of statistics, most offenders are likely to be diagnosed
with mild mental retardation, the level that “constitutes the largest segment (about
85%) of those with the disorder.” DSM-IV-TR, supra note 38, at 43. Moderate mental
retardation “constitutes about 10% of the entire population of people with Mental
Retardation,” while “[t]he group with Severe Mental Retardation constitutes 3%-4% of
individuals with Mental Retardation.” Id. Additionally, all defendants with severe
mental retardation and most with moderate mental retardation will likely be found
incompetent to stand trial. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)
(ruling that to be competent to stand trial, a defendant must have “sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding”
and must have “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him”).
63
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002).
64
James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal
Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 429 (1985).
65
Caroline Everington & Solomon M. Fulero, Competence to Confess:
Measuring Understanding and Suggestibility of Defendants with Mental Retardation,
37 MENTAL RETARDATION 212, 212-13 (1999); Rachel Levy-Shiff, Peri Kedem & Zamira
Sevillia, Ego Identity in Mentally Retarded Adolescents, 94 AM. J. MENTAL
RETARDATION 541, 546-47 (1990); Thomas L. Whitman, Self-Regulation and Mental
Retardation, 94 AM. J. MENTAL RETARDATION 347, 360 (1990).
66
Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 64.
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about character traits that people who are mentally retarded
often exhibit, statements such as “People with mental
retardation are often described as impulsive or as having poor
impulse control,” and “Studies on the moral development of
people with mental retardation reveal that some individuals
have incomplete or immature concepts of blameworthiness and
causation.”67 Nowhere in this article, however, is there any
statement asserting that all mentally retarded people possess
any particular traits.
The three social science articles similarly fail to support
the contention that certain psychological characteristics are
universally observed in people who are mentally retarded. The
paper on self-regulation reviews the literature on this trait for
the purpose of proposing a comprehensive program to improve
self-regulation among people with mental retardation.68
Although the page that the Atkins Court cited does include
such broad statements as “In summary, individuals with
mental retardation have great difficulty regulating their own
behavior,”69 the article earlier cautioned that “considerable
research is needed to delineate the structure of the selfregulation system among nonretarded and retarded persons.”70
The study of ego identity found that among mentally
retarded adolescents, as compared to non-mentally retarded
adolescents and preadolescents, “[d]iffused identity was
particularly evident in three areas: feelings of meaningfulness,
physical self, and mastery,”71 while the study of competence to
confess found that “significantly more persons with mental
retardation than without mental retardation” both “did not
meet minimum criteria for competence [to confess]” and “did
not understand any of the substantive portions of the
[Miranda] warning.”72 If in these studies all mentally retarded
subjects demonstrated weaker ego identity or diminished
competence to confess, such a result is not obvious from the
published reports.73
67

Id. at 429. These statements are preceded by the statement that
“[m]entally retarded people are individuals. Any attempt to describe them as a group
risks false stereotyping and therefore demands the greatest caution.” Id. at 427.
68
Whitman, supra note 65.
69
Id. at 360.
70
Id. at 355.
71
Levy-Shiff, Kedem & Sevillia, supra note 65, at 545.
72
Everington & Fulero, supra note 65, at 216.
73
For example, while the study of ego identity reported significant
differences between mentally retarded adolescents and the two comparison groups
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In sum, all three social science sources as well as the
law review article are consistent with the Atkins Court’s
statement that people who are mentally retarded “often” act
impulsively and at the direction of others.74 In this particular
statement, though, the Court itself modifies its absolutist
position that mentally retarded offenders “by definition”
possess certain traits that make them less culpable than
offenders who are not mentally retarded.75
2. Roper v. Simmons
As in Atkins, the Court in Roper explained its decision
to adopt a categorical exclusion from eligibility for the death
penalty—this time, for offenders who committed their crimes
when they were not yet eighteen years old—as justified by two
findings: that a national consensus exists against the death
penalty for juveniles,76 and that juvenile offenders are less
culpable for their actions than non-juvenile offenders.77
Compared to the Atkins decision, with its assertions that
mentally retarded offenders “by definition” possess certain
personality traits that render them incapable of death penaltylevel culpability, the Court in Roper is somewhat better about
qualifying its statements regarding juvenile offenders’
character traits.
For example, the Court stated that
immaturity and irresponsibility are traits “found in youth more
often than in adults.”78 The statements most clearly implying a
recognition that not all people under the age of eighteen are
(non-mentally retarded adolescents and preadolescents) on three measures of ego
identity, significant differences were not observed on three other measures
(commitment and purpose, social recognition, and genuineness). Levy-Shiff, Kedem &
Sevillia, supra note 65, at 546.
74
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
75
For another discussion of the lack of fit between scientific research and the
Court’s reasoning in Atkins, see Christopher L. Chauvin, Atkins v. Virginia: How
Flawed Conclusions Convert Good Intentions Into Bad Law, 65 LA. L. REV. 473 (2004).
The author, a law student at Louisiana State University, interviewed a clinical
psychologist whose textbook was cited by the petitioners and who “suggests that it is
‘patently false’ that either any of his, []or any of the widely respected scientific
research, can lead one to conclude that a diagnosis of mental retardation necessitates a
conclusion that the offenders[] is less culpable for his acts.” Id. at 500-01 (citing
interviews with Johnny L. Matson, Ph.D., Director of Clinical Training in Psychology,
Louisiana State University, in Baton Rouge, LA (Sept. 2002-Nov. 2002)).
76
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).
77
Id. at 571 (“Once the diminished culpability of juveniles is recognized, it is
evident that the penological justifications for the death penalty apply to them with
lesser force than to adults.”).
78
Id. at 569.
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necessarily less culpable for their actions than people who are
eighteen years old79 are found near the end of the opinion,
where the Court resorted to the assertion that “a line must be
drawn somewhere” to explain why it was adopting a categorical
exclusion from capital punishment for sixteen- and seventeenyear-old offenders but not for eighteen- or nineteen-year-old
offenders.80
Despite its apparent recognition that the correlation
between age and culpability is less than perfect, the Roper
Court did not acknowledge that categorically excluding
juveniles from the death penalty might result in equally
culpable offenders receiving unequally severe sentences. Thus,
even though the Roper opinion’s reasoning is an improvement
over the reasoning in Atkins,81 both decisions fail to consider
even the possibility that categorical exclusions will impact not
only those offenders who are excluded from the death penalty
but also those offenders who remain subject to this
punishment.

79
The Court is not, however, consistent in maintaining this insight. E.g., id.
at 571 (referring to “the diminished culpability of juveniles” and the “characteristics
that render juveniles less culpable than adults”).
80
Id. at 574. The Court offers an unsatisfactory explanation of why linedrawing is necessary. Id. (“The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for
many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which
the line for death eligibility ought to rest.”). Criminal sentencing—particularly death
penalty sentencing—is supposed to be the ultimate in individualized assessment.
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (“Given that the imposition of death by public
authority is so profoundly different from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the
conclusion that an individualized decision is essential in capital cases. The need for
treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due the
uniqueness of the individual is far more important than in noncapital cases.”). That
governments draw lines for voting and marrying and other mass activities is not at all
relevant to the question whether categorical rules should apply to eligibility for capital
punishment.
81
The Roper Court’s sources, however, are perhaps no better than those in
Atkins. See Deborah W. Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings of Roper v. Simmons, 3
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 379, 380 (2006) (“For such a deep and important opinion, Roper is
far too scanty, vague, and dated in explaining how and why modern science justifies
the legal distinction between juveniles and adults.”). The difference in citation
problems between Atkins and Roper is that while the Roper Court could have found
better sources to support its claims that as a group juveniles are more likely than
adults to possess certain character traits that influence culpability, sources simply do
not exist that would support the Atkins Court’s claims about the necessarily
diminished culpability of people who are mentally retarded.
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From Categorical Exclusions to Problematic
Punishments
1. Unjust Punishments: Treating Like Cases Unalike
The old Aristotelian principle still holds true: like cases are to be
treated alike, and unlike cases unalike.82

By excluding some offenders from the death penalty on
the basis of criteria that are only imperfectly correlated with
culpability, the categorical rules adopted in Atkins and Roper
allow equally culpable offenders to receive unequally severe
sentences. For example, a person who breaks into a woman’s
house, wraps her face in duct tape and binds her hands and
feet with electrical cord, then tosses her off a bridge to drown83
might receive a death sentence if he commits this crime a week
after his eighteenth birthday, while a person who commits this
same crime a week before his eighteenth birthday cannot
receive the same sentence.84 Nothing the Roper Court said—or
could have said—about juveniles, however, supports a
conclusion that the not-quite eighteen-year-old cannot have
acted with the same level of culpability as the just-barely
eighteen-year-old.85 Thus, the just-barely eighteen-year-old
82
Margareth Etienne, Parity, Disparity, and Adversariality: First Principles
of Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 309, 311 (2005). More recently, Congress enacted the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines to achieve equality in sentencing. See id. at 315 (“It has
been said that the principal goal of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines has been ‘to
reduce unjustified disparities and so reach toward the evenhandedness and neutrality
that are the distinguishing marks of any principled system of justice.’” (quoting Koon v.
United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996))); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution
of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 825 n.234 (2006) (“The chief justification for
the Guidelines was the elimination of unjustified sentencing disparity.”). Although the
Supreme Court recently declared unconstitutional on Sixth Amendment grounds the
statutory provision making the Guidelines mandatory, the Court also preserved an
advisory role for the Guidelines. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005)
(ruling that as modified by the Court’s decision, the Federal Sentencing Act “makes the
Guidelines effectively advisory. It requires a sentencing court to consider Guidelines
ranges, but it permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory
concerns as well.” (internal citations omitted)).
83
These are the undisputed although abbreviated facts of Roper v. Simmons.
543 U.S. 551, 556-57 (2005).
84
For a similar example, see generally Joseph L. Hoffmann, On the Perils of
Line Drawing: Juveniles and the Death Penalty, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 229 (1989).
85
David O. Brink, Immaturity, Normative Competence, and Juvenile
Transfer: How (Not) to Punish Minors for Major Crimes, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1555, 1584
(2004) (“[A]ge is an imperfect proxy for maturity. Even if maturation is reasonably
regular, so that there is a significant correlation between age and maturity, there will
be individual variance. Some 16-year-olds will have as much normative competence as
the normal 18-year-old, and some 16-year-olds will have as much normative
competence as the normal 14-year-old.” (footnote omitted)). According to Judge Posner,
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who does receive a death sentence for this crime has a valid
argument that so long as his actions were no more harmful and
his mental state no more culpable, he should not be punished
more severely than the not-quite eighteen-year-old.86
The just-barely non-mentally retarded87 offender has the
same argument. For example, a person who abducts a man at
gunpoint from a convenience store parking lot, forces him to
drive to an ATM machine and withdraw money, then shoots
him eight times88 might receive a death sentence for
committing this murder if his score on an IQ test is 78
(generally outside the range of a mental retardation diagnosis)
while a person who scores 74 on an IQ test and is found to be
mentally retarded cannot receive the same sentence.89

The Justices in the [Roper] majority should not have relied on a psychological
literature that they mistakenly believed showed that persons under eighteen
are incapable of mature moral reflection. One does not have to be a social
scientist to know that such an inference cannot be correct. Chronological age
does not coincide with mental or emotional maturity; age eighteen is not an
inflection point at which teenagers suddenly acquire an adult capacity for
moral behavior. The studies on which the Court relied acknowledge that
their findings that sixteen- or seventeen-year-olds are less likely to make
mature judgments than eighteen-year-olds are statistical rather than
individual and do not support a categorical exclusion of sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds from the ranks of the mature.
Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119
HARV. L. REV. 31, 64-65 (2005).
86
STEPHEN NATHANSON, AN EYE FOR AN EYE?: THE IMMORALITY OF
PUNISHING BY DEATH 62 (2d ed. 2001) (“If death is arbitrarily imposed on only some
who deserve it, while others equally deserving are treated more leniently, then those
who are executed are treated unjustly, even if they deserved to die.”); see also Joseph L.
Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 65,
121 (noting though not necessarily endorsing the position “that even defendants who
have committed aggravated capital crimes may properly claim injustice if they are
given death sentences when others of equal or greater culpability receive prison
terms”).
87
There is a diagnostic category for people who are not quite mentally
retarded: Borderline Intellectual Functioning. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 38, at 740.
(“This category can be used when the focus of clinical attention is associated with
borderline intellectual functioning; that is, an IQ in the 71-84 range.”).
88
These facts are simplified from Atkins, in which the defendant admitted
participating in the abduction and armed robbery but claimed that someone else was
the triggerman. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307-08 (2002).
89
The DSM criteria for mild mental retardation specify an IQ score in the
range of 55 to “approximately 70.” DSM-IV-TR, supra note 38, at 49. Because of a five
point margin of error for IQ tests, “it is possible to diagnose Mental Retardation in
individuals with IQ scores between 71 and 75 if they have significant deficits in
adaptive behavior that meet the criteria for Mental Retardation.” Id. at 48.
The Flynn effect complicates matters further. This effect refers to the
increase in IQ scores over time. See Stephen J. Ceci, Matthew Scullin & Tomoe
Kanaya, The Difficulty of Basing Death Penalty Eligibility on IQ Cutoff Scores for
Mental Retardation, 13 ETHICS & BEHAV. 11, 12 (2003). Specifically, this effect means
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Although age is an imperfect marker for culpability,
drawing the incapable-of-death-penalty-level-culpability line at
seventeen years, three hundred and sixty four days old at least
has the virtues, as compared to mental retardation as a marker
for culpability, of simplicity and objectivity. Like age, mental
retardation is an imperfect marker for culpability, but unlike
determining whether someone is or is not eighteen years old,
determining whether someone is or is not mentally retarded
involves a host of complex and subjective assessments.
A diagnosis of mental retardation is based on three
findings: significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, almost
always as measured by an IQ test;90 significantly impaired
adaptive functioning in at least one (AAMR definition) or two
(APA definition) areas of daily life;91 and manifestation of these
impairments before adulthood.92 All three criteria require
judgment calls on the part of the person making the
assessment.
Administering an IQ test involves literally hundreds of
judgment calls. For example, the IQ test most commonly
administered to adults, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence ScaleIII (WAIS-III),93 consists of fourteen subtests, three of which
(Comprehension, Similarities, and Vocabulary) require the
examiner to score open-ended responses. Thus, the examiner
must decide whether to award zero, one, or two points to a
response such as “For when it rains,” to a question such as
that “the use of IQ norms based on a prior cohort of test-takers progressively inflates
the IQ scores of subsequent cohorts of test-takers.” Id. Expert opinions differ as to
how examiners should take the Flynn effect into account in individual cases. Compare
id. at 16 (arguing that “it is insufficient for courts to simply ask for an IQ score”), with
I. Bruce Frumkin, Challenging Expert Testimony on Intelligence and Mental
Retardation, 34 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 51, 60 (2006) (“This is not to say that a psychologist
should ‘adjust’ the IQ score to take into consideration the Flynn effect.”), and Jianjun
Zhu & David S. Tulsky, Can IQ Gain Be Accurately Quantified by a Simple Difference
Formula?, 88 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 1255, 1259-60 (1999) (suggesting that the
Flynn effect should not cause examiners to adjust individual IQ scores).
90
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 38, at 49.
91
“Adaptive functioning refers to how effectively individuals cope with
common life demands and how well they meet the standards of personal independence
expected of someone in their particular age group, sociocultural background, and
community setting.” Id. at 42.
92
These three components are similar though not identical in the two most
widely accepted approaches to diagnosing mental retardation; the DSM criteria and
the AAMR criteria. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
93
See ALAN S. KAUFMAN & ELIZABETH O. LICHTENBERGER, ESSENTIALS OF
WAIS-III ASSESSMENT 4-5 (1999) [hereinafter KAUFMAN & LICHTENBERGER,
ESSENTIALS OF WAIS-III] (“Although many new instruments for measuring intellectual
functioning have been developed in the past decade, the Wechsler scales are the most
frequently used.”).
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“What is an umbrella for?”94 What matters is not that the
examiner award an objectively or normatively “correct” number
of points but rather that the examiner award the same number
of points as were awarded for similar responses when the test
questions were normed; otherwise, the IQ score derived from
the items will be invalid.95
Adding to the difficulty of administering the WAIS-III is
that seven of the subtests are timed (Arithmetic, Picture
Completion, Picture Arrangement, Object Assembly, Digit
Symbol-Coding, Symbol Search, and Block Design).96 The
amount of time allotted for various tasks is measured in
seconds (e.g., 120 seconds for Digit Symbol-Coding;97 for Picture
Arrangement, 30 seconds for item one, 45 seconds for item two,
60 seconds for items three and four, 90 seconds for items five
and six, and 120 seconds for items seven through eleven98).
Allowing someone a few additional seconds to copy symbols or
complete a puzzle might add points to his IQ score.99 A
textbook authored by two leading experts on intelligence
testing stresses the importance of properly administering and
scoring every item on the WAIS-III:
Standardized administration and scoring means conducting an
experiment with N=1 every time an examiner tests someone on an
intelligence test.
For the results of this experiment to be
meaningful, the experimenter-examiner must adhere precisely to the
wording in the manual, give appropriate probes as defined in the
94

This is a real question from the WISC-R, the revised Wechsler IQ test for
children, which was discussed in detail in a court opinion (the Psychological
Corporation, which publishes the Wechsler tests, does not make test items available to
the general public). The court explained the official instructions for scoring responses
to this question as:
Two-point responses are: “Use it to keep the rain off . . . protects you when it
rains . . . put it over your head when it rains . . . so you don’t get wet when it
rains.” One-point responses are: “Carry it when it rains . . . big round thing
that can fold up . . . put it over your head . . . to keep off the sun . . . you hold
it up (gives appropriate demonstration) . . . helps you if it starts
raining . . . keeps you dry.”
Parents in Action on Special Educ. v. Hannon, 506 F. Supp. 831, 844 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
95
See infra text accompanying note 100; see also GARY GROTH-MARNAT,
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 139 (4th ed. 2003) (“[T]here is a certain
degree of subjectivity when scoring many of the items on [the] Comprehension,
Similarities, and Vocabulary [subtests of the WAIS]. Thus, a ‘hard’ scorer may develop
a somewhat lower score than an ‘easy’ scorer.”).
96
KAUFMAN & LICHTENBERGER, ESSENTIALS OF WAIS-III, supra note 93, at
25.
97
Id. at 32.
98
Id. at 45.
99
See infra text accompanying note 100.
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instructions, time each relevant response diligently, and score each
item exactly the way comparable responses were scored during the
normative procedures. . . . [I]t is vital for an examiner to follow the
standardized procedures to the letter while administering the test;
otherwise, the standard scores yielded for the person will be invalid
and meaningless.100

After all of the items on the individual subtests are
administered and scored, these scores must be added,
subtracted, and/or multiplied (depending on the subtest) to
obtain raw scores for each subtest; the raw scores must then be
converted to scaled scores; finally, the scaled scores must be
converted to indexes, or IQ scores.101 Studies of not only
graduate student trainees but also experienced Ph.D.
examiners have reported scoring errors that resulted in huge
variability—ten points or more—in obtained IQ scores.102
Assessing the second diagnostic criterion, adaptive
functioning, is not a simple endeavor either.103 Inclusion of
adaptive functioning as a component of a mental retardation
diagnosis was intended to balance the emphasis on the
100
ALAN S. KAUFMAN & ELIZABETH O. LICHTENBERGER, ASSESSING
ADOLESCENT AND ADULT INTELLIGENCE 20 (3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter KAUFMAN &
LICHTENBERGER, ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE]; accord Alvin Enis House & Marjorie L.
Lewis, Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale—Revised, in MAJOR PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS 326 (Charles S. Newmark ed., 1985) (“It is difficult to
stress this point strongly enough—a poorly administered instrument yields useless
information.”).
101
KAUFMAN & LICHTENBERGER, ESSENTIALS OF WAIS-III, supra note 93, at
60-61.
102
KAUFMAN & LICHTENBERGER, ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE, supra note 100, at
198-99 (citing Joseph Ryan, Aurelio Prifitera, & Linda Powers, Scoring Reliability of
the WAIS-R, 51 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 149 (1983)); see also GROTHMARNAT, supra note 95, at 143 (noting that “the number of administration and scoring
errors on the part of trainees and experienced clinicians is far higher than [it] should
be” (citations omitted)).
103
See Linda Knauss & Joshua Kutinsky, Into the Briar Patch: Ethical
Dilemmas Facing Psychologists Following Atkins v. Virginia, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 121,
122 (2004) (“Determinations regarding adaptive functioning are often subjective and
left largely to the clinical judgment of mental health professionals.” (citing AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 39-40 (4th ed. 1994))). State courts are increasingly expressing frustration
with the subjectivity of evaluating adaptive functioning. See, e.g., State v. Burke, No.
04AP-12342005, 2005 WL 3557641, at *8 (Ohio App. Dec. 30, 2005) (“Although experts
offer insightful opinions, the adaptive behavior criteria are subjective, and experts will
offer opinions on both sides of the issue.”); Ex parte Rodriguez, 164 S.W.3d 400, 405-06
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (Cochran, J., concurring) (“As experts on both sides in this case
testified, there are no objectively verifiable standards by which to gauge whether a
specific person does or does not suffer the kind of significant ‘adaptive deficits’ that a
diagnosis of mental retardation requires.”); Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004) (“The adaptive behavior criteria are exceedingly subjective, and
undoubtedly experts will be found to offer opinions on both sides of the issue in most
cases.”).
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academic kinds of intelligence measured by IQ tests with a
Historically,
different, practical kind of intelligence.104
examiners have assessed adaptive functioning on the
inherently subjective bases of interviews, observations, and
professional judgment.105 Recently, researchers have developed
a number of test instruments for quantifying adaptive
functioning.106 These instruments, however, can be less than
ideal for assessing adult criminal defendants who might be
mentally retarded. The first problem is that most of these
instruments require the availability of at least one caregiver, or
other reliable independent source, to provide information.107
Additionally, the particular populations that were used to
develop a test’s norms determine the general usefulness of that
test; the norms for one widely used test, the Vineland Adaptive
Behavior Scales, were developed with juveniles,108 while the
104

See AAMR DEFINITION 2002, supra note 39, at 24 (“The addition of
adaptive behavior limitations as a criterion for diagnosing mental retardation was
intended to better reflect the social characteristics of the disability, to reduce reliance
on IQ scores, and to decrease the number of ‘false positives,’ or individuals falsely
identified as having mental retardation.”); see also Stephen Greenspan, What Is Meant
by Mental Retardation?, 11 INT’L REV. PSYCHIATRY 6, 14 (1999) (noting that the term
“adaptive behaviour” was “invented by the AAMR for use in its dual criteria definition
of [mental retardation]”).
105
Reiss, supra note 40, at 4, cited in Note, Implementing Atkins, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 2565, 2575 (2003) [hereinafter Implementing Atkins].
106
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 38, at 42. Two popular tests are the Vineland
Adaptive Behavior Scales, which includes questions about communication, daily living
skills, socialization, and motor skills, and the American Association on Mental
Retardation Adaptive Behavior Scale, which includes items measuring personal selfsufficiency, community self-sufficiency, personal-social responsibility, and social
adjustment. Id.
107
This is a general problem with assessing adaptive functioning. See DSMIV-TR, supra note 38, at 42 (“It is useful to gather evidence for deficits in adaptive
functioning from one or more reliable independent sources (e.g., teacher evaluation and
educational, developmental, and medical history).”). Some instruments require that
the information come from someone other than the person being assessed. Frumkin,
supra note 89, at 57 (“The most common mistake forensic clinicians make in these
[adaptive functioning] assessments is to evaluate adaptive functioning by giving the
Vineland or [Adaptive Behavior Scales] tests to the defendant rather than to a family
member or individual who knows the defendant well. Such administration procedures
invalidate the testing for a variety [of] reasons in addition to violating the instructions
for test administration contained in the tests’ manuals.”).
108
See Nigel Beail, Utility of the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales in
Diagnosis and Research with Adults Who Have Mental Retardation, 41 MENTAL
RETARDATION 286, 286 (2003) (stating that for the 1984 Vineland, “[t]he
standardization of the instrument was conducted with a sample of 3,000 individuals
from birth to 18 years 11 months who were selected across the United States according
to demographic information from the 1980 Census”); id. at 287 (“The Vineland has
some major psychometric deficiencies when used with adults who have mental
retardation.”). According to Pearson Assessments, which publishes the Vineland, a
second edition of this test, with an expanded age range, was introduced in 2006. See
Vineland
Adaptive
Behavior
Scales,
Second
Edition
(Vineland
II),
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norms for the AAMR’s Adaptive Behavior Scales were based
only on adults diagnosed with developmental disabilities.109
Finally, because adaptive functioning is context-dependent,110
assessment can be especially difficult when a person has been
living in an atypical environment such as a prison.111
The final diagnostic criterion—that impairments in
intelligence and adaptive functioning must be evident before
age eighteen—also presents problems when someone is
evaluated for the first time as an adult. The primary difficulty
is that the examiner might be unable to determine, because of
missing school records or the absence of family members,
whether any present impairments began in childhood.112
Because of the layers of complexity and subjectivity
involved in diagnosing mental retardation, using mental
retardation as a marker for culpability creates perhaps an even
greater risk of producing unequal sentences for equal
http://ags.pearsonassessments.com/group.asp?nGroupInfoID=aVineland (last visited
Mar. 27, 2007). Whether this new version adequately resolves the old version’s
psychometric problems, without introducing additional problems, remains to be
investigated.
109
AAMR DEFINITION 2002, supra note 39, at 89 (noting that the Residential
and Community version of the AAMR Adaptive Behavior Scales “was developed to be
appropriate for individuals through 79 years of age, but norms are not available for
adults with typical functioning”). The only other version of the Adaptive Behavior
Scales, the School and Community version, is unsuitable for assessing adults because it
“provides norms through age 21 and includes items appropriate for school settings that
may not be related to adult environments.” Id.
110
Id. at 8 (“Limitations in present functioning must be considered within the
context of community environments typical of the individual’s age peers and culture.”);
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 38, at 42 (noting that “behaviors that would normally be
considered maladaptive (e.g., dependency, passivity) may be evidence of good
adaptation in the context of a particular individual’s life (e.g., in some institutional
settings)”).
111
See Stanley L. Brodsky & Virginia A. Galloway, Ethical and Professional
Demands for Forensic Mental Health Professionals in the Post-Atkins Era, 13 ETHICS &
BEHAV. 3, 7 (2003) (“Our inquiries into what evaluators from institutions for the
retarded would use with someone who has been in jail or prison for many years or on
death row indicated that an assessment of adaptive functioning would be difficult.”);
Caroline Everington & Denis W. Keyes, Diagnosing Mental Retardation in Criminal
Proceedings: The Critical Importance of Documenting Adaptive Behavior, 8 FORENSIC
EXAMINER 31, 33 (1999) (“In situations of prolonged incarcerations, neither
standardized instruments nor informal questionnaires are appropriate as the
individual has no opportunity to perform in most of the skill domains.”); see also Robert
H. Bruininks et al., Adaptive Behavior and Mental Retardation, 21 J. SPECIAL EDUC.
69, 77-80 (1987) (discussing the effect of environment on adaptive behavior), cited in
Implementing Atkins, supra note 105, at 2576.
112
Cf. John M. Fabian, Death Penalty Mitigation and the Role of the Forensic
Psychologist, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 73, 114 (2003) (“Objective adaptive functioning
assessment instruments may not be available in the defendant’s past records and it
may be difficult to assess current adaptive functioning due to inability to contact family
members and friends and obtain relevant information.”).
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culpability than does using age as a marker. An offender who
obtains an accurate IQ score placing him just outside the range
of mental retardation—while another, no less culpable offender
obtains a slightly lower score, one that is within the mentally
retarded range, because the examiner who administered the IQ
test misscored a few items or miscalculated a few scales, for
example—has a valid argument that in neither case should a
mental retardation diagnosis be grounds for either allowing or
not allowing the jury to impose the death penalty. Moreover,
even if the second offender’s lower score were accurate, and he
really did meet the criteria for a diagnosis of mental
retardation, the first offender—the one who really did not meet
the criteria for a diagnosis of mental retardation—would still
have a valid argument that although his greater mental ability
makes him more likely to be more culpable, he should not be
punished more severely unless he actually is more culpable.113
In sum, the categorical exclusions adopted in Atkins and
Roper affect not only the juvenile and mentally retarded
offenders who cannot receive a sentence of death but also the
non-juvenile and non-mentally retarded offenders who remain
subject to capital punishment. The decisions in Atkins and
Roper leave those offenders who are not excluded from capital
punishment with a valid argument that their death sentences
are unjust because like cases are not being treated alike.114
2. Arbitrary Punishments: “Not Based on the Nature of
Things”
In the Oxford English Dictionary, among the definitions
of “arbitrary” is the entry “not based on the nature of things.”115
When a death sentence is avoided (or not avoided) solely
because of age or mental ability, the punishment is arbitrary;
113

See supra note 86.
Of course, perfect equality in sentencing is not attainable, nor is it
contitutionally required. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 54 (1984) (“Any capital
sentencing scheme may occasionally produce aberrational outcomes.”). However, the
kind of inequality invited by Atkins and Roper should not be tolerated. It is one thing
to accept that aberrations might occassionally occur; it is quite another thing to adopt a
sentencing scheme that systematically excludes from capital punishment offenders who
are not necessarily any less culpable than those who remain subject to this penalty.
See Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1794 (1987) (“The absence of perfection may mean an occasional
lapse from the norm or it may mean routine, gross disregard for it.”); see also supra
notes 149-56 and accompanying text (discussing sources of sentencing inequality).
115
1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 602 (2d ed. 1989) (definition 3).
114
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that is, the punishment is not based on the nature of the
particular things—act and culpability for the act116—on which
punishment ought to be based.117
The arbitrary imposition of death sentences once caused
the Supreme Court to declare capital punishment
unconstitutional. In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Court
ruled that Georgia’s death penalty sentencing scheme, which
allowed juries unbounded discretion in deciding whether to
sentence an offender convicted of a capital crime to death,
produced sentencing patterns that were so arbitrary as to
violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
Although five justices agreed that the
punishments.118
sentencing scheme was unconstitutional, the justices could not
come together to express their reasons in a single opinion;
instead, each justice wrote only for himself. The one thread
that connects the five opinions is their consensus regarding the
unacceptable arbitrariness of Georgia’s death penalty.119
116

See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
As explained supra note 21, this Article does not discuss other factors that
might legitimately influence punishment, particularly deterrence and incapacitation,
because they are not relevant to the desirability of categorically excluding juvenile and
mentally retarded offenders from capital punishment.
118
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
119
The Court’s opinion was issued per curiam with each of the concurring (as
well as dissenting) justices writing separately to explain his position, which has caused
some difficulty identifying the central reasoning of Furman. Most commentators agree,
however, that arbitrariness was the key defect in the statutes that Furman held
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Jack Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE
L.J. 908, 914 (1982) (“Although nine separate opinions accompanied the [Furman]
Court’s per curiam decision, it is fair to say that the case stands for the proposition
that capital punishment, as then administered, was inflicted arbitrarily or ‘freakishly,’
as one of the Justices put it, and was therefore cruel and unusual.” (footnote omitted));
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and
Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587, 592 (2005) (“All five of the Justices supporting the
decision expressed concerns about arbitrariness, pointing to the absence of safeguards
or procedures that would ensure the fair selection of the condemned.”); see also Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The provision for appellate
review in the Georgia capital-sentencing system serves as a check against the random
or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.”).
Because in 1972 almost all death penalty statutes allowed this kind of
discretion, the Furman decision effectively shut down capital punishment nationwide.
Jordan M. Steiker, The Limits of Legal Language: Decisionmaking in Capital Cases, 94
MICH. L. REV. 2590, 2592 n.12 (1996) (“Of the 40 state statutes in effect at the time of
Furman, all but Rhode Island’s suffered from the defect of ‘standardless’ discretion and
were thus unenforceable in light of the decision.”). Many commentators expected the
ruling to mark the beginning of the end of capital punishment in this country. The
Supreme Court, 1986 Term—Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 149, 149 (1987) (“The
Supreme Court’s decision in Furman led many observers to believe that the death
penalty in America was effectively nullified.” (citing Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon
Hawkins, Capital Punishment and the Eighth Amendment: Furman and Gregg in
117
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Perhaps the clearest expression of the justices’ belief
that equally culpable offenders must receive equally severe
sentences is Justice Stewart’s statement that “of all the people
convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as
reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a
capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence
of death has in fact been imposed.”120 The justices did not
question whether those who had been sentenced to death
deserved this punishment; instead, they questioned why these
offenders had been sentenced to death while others who
equally deserved this punishment had not. The justices could
find no good reason. Justice Marshall observed that “the
burden of capital punishment falls upon the poor, the ignorant,
and the under privileged members of society,” while “the
wealthier, better-represented, just-as-guilty person can escape”
this punishment.121 Several justices suggested that there
simply was no reason why some offenders received death
sentences while other, no less culpable offenders did not; death
sentences were a matter of pure chance or bad luck. Justice
Stewart, for example, wrote that the death penalty was cruel
and unusual “in the same way that being struck by lightning is
cruel and unusual.”122 Similarly, Justice Brennan declared:
“When the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number
of the cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is
virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily.
Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery system.”123
Justice Brennan considered the possibility that rather
than suggesting arbitrariness, the small number of death
sentences suggested that juries were imposing this penalty
only in the most deserving cases. The problem with this
possibility, according to Justice Brennan, was that “[n]o one
has yet suggested a rational basis that could differentiate in
those terms the few who die from the many who go to prison.”124

Retrospect, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 927, 944 (1985))). Just four years later, though, the
Court upheld statutes that allowed juries to impose death sentences under certain
enumerated “aggravating” circumstances, such as when a murder was committed for
the purpose of obtaining money or avoiding arrest. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 158-207
(plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion).
120
Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
121
Id. at 365-66 (Marshall, J., concurring).
122
Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
123
Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring).
124
Id. at 294.
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Justice White similarly observed that the death penalty as
imposed in Georgia lacked a “meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the
many cases in which it is not.”125 Without such a rational,
meaningful basis, the death penalty was, as Justice Douglas
wrote, “not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the
laws that is implicit in the ban on ‘cruel and unusual’
punishments.”126
The moral of Furman is that noncomparative justice is
not enough.127 Even if those who are sentenced to death
deserve this punishment, their sentences are arbitrary unless
some meaningful difference exists between them and other
defendants who do not receive this punishment.128 If age and
mental ability were perfect correlates of culpability, then such
a meaningful difference would exist between, for example, the
offender who is one week away from his eighteenth birthday
125

Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
127
Noncomparative justice is concerned with whether and to what extent a
person deserves to be punished, independent of whether and to what extent other
people are punished. Thus we can agree with Justice Stewart that even a single day in
prison for the “crime” of having a cold would be unjust, regardless of how many other
people received this same punishment for the same “offense.” Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (“Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual
punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.”). If, however, some amount of
time in prison could be a just sentence for having a cold, then it would matter whether
other people with colds were punished, and what punishments they were given. A
day’s imprisonment might be an appropriate sentence when considered in isolation, but
if other offenders were receiving several months in prison—or receiving no prison time
at all—then the sentences would be unjust in a comparative sense.
The terms “comparative” and “noncomparative” justice are commonly
attributed to Joel Feinberg. E.g., JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 98-99 (1973);
Joel Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice, 83 PHIL. REV. 297 (1974). Other writers have
used different terms to refer to the same concepts. E.g., R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT,
COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 133 (2001) (using the terms “absolute
proportionality” and “relative proportionality”); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE
CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 38-46
(1985) (applying terms of “cardinal” proportionality and “ordinal” proportionality to
sentencing); Thomas Hurka, Desert: Individualistic and Holistic, in DESERT AND
JUSTICE 45, 45-48 (Serena Olsaretti ed., 2003) (using the terms “individualistic” and
“holistic”), cited in Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive
Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 710 n.156 (2005).
128
Stephen P. Garvey, Is It Wrong to Commute Death Row? Retribution,
Atonement, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1319, 1330 (2004) (“Retributive justice requires
an offender to be punished because and to the extent, but only to the extent, he
deserves to be punished. Moreover, as a perfect obligation, retributive justice is subject
to the demands of equality. Like cases must be treated alike.”); Andrew von Hirsch,
Hybrid Principles in Allocating Sanctions: A Response to Professor Robinson, 82 NW. U.
L. REV. 64, 65 (1987) (“In sentencing, the most important desert requirement is that of
ordinal proportionality. Acts of comparable seriousness should receive punishments of
approximately equal severity.”).
126
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and the offender who is one week past his, or between the
offender with an IQ score of 78 and the offender whose score is
74. But because such perfect correlations do not exist, neither
age nor mental ability alone meaningfully distinguishes
offenders who deserve the death penalty from those who do
not.129 As a result, it is arbitrary to allow a jury to sentence
someone to death because he is a few days older or because he
scores a few points higher on an IQ test than someone who,
with similar culpability, committed a similar crime yet because
of his age or mental ability is categorically excluded from
capital punishment.130
3. Excessive Punishments: More Severe Than the
Legislature Intended
The text of the Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and
unusual punishments.”131 The Supreme Court has interpreted
this provision to also prohibit punishments that are
excessive.132 Although the Court’s decisions leave unclear
exactly how to measure excessiveness—excessive as compared
to what?133—one way a sentence may violate the Eighth
Amendment is by being more severe than the statutorily

129

See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
Philosopher Stephen Nathanson similarly argues that it would be
arbitrary to fail one student for plagiarizing but not to fail, because of sympathy,
another student who also plagiarized:
130

If I have a stated policy of failing students who plagiarize, then it is unjust
for me to pass students with whom I sympathize. Whether I am sympathetic
or not is irrelevant, and I am treating the student whom I do fail unjustly
because I am not acting simply on the basis of desert. Rather, I am acting on
the basis of desert plus degree of sympathy.
Stephen Nathanson, Does It Matter if the Death Penalty Is Arbitrarily Administered?,
14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 149, 157 (1985).
131
U.S. Const. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
132
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 552 (2005) (explaining that in
Atkins “the Court ruled that the death penalty constitutes an excessive sanction for the
entire category of mentally retarded offenders”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311
n.7 (2002) (“[W]e have read the text of the [Eighth] Amendment to prohibit all
excessive punishments, as well as cruel and unusual punishments that may or may not
be excessive.”); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment
bars not only those punishments that are ‘barbaric’ but also those that are ‘excessive’ in
relation to the crime committed.”).
133
This question is borrowed from Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison
Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to
What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571 (2005).
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sanctioned punishments.134 Thus, the Supreme Court could
not, for example, require a non-death penalty state to impose
this punishment.135
When the Court ruled that mentally retarded and
juvenile offenders could no longer be sentenced to death, the
death penalty became an even more severe, and perhaps
excessive, punishment for those still subject to it. One reason
excluding some offenders whom a legislature meant to be
included results in more severe punishments for those who are
still included is that the punitive value of a punishment is in
part a function of how many people receive the punishment.
When capital punishment was imposed for many offenses—not
just murder but also witchcraft, adultery, pig theft, and
burning down tobacco warehouses136—death was not, in a
relative sense, an especially severe sentence. Those sentenced
to death were condemned as ordinary, run-of-the-mill felons.
Now, when capital punishment is reserved for the “worst of the
worst” murders,137 death is an especially severe sentence.
Those sentenced to death are condemned as less than human.138
134
See Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After
Rodney King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29 & n.149 (1995) (noting that “judges may not
impose greater punishment than the legislature has authorized” and that the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of excessive punishment “plainly includ[es] punishment
beyond that legislatively authorized”); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.
299, 304 (1932) (holding that legislative intent determines whether cumulative
punishments may be imposed for the same conduct: “[W]here the same act or
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each
provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”).
135
See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out?
Refining the Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835,
865 (1992) [hereinafter Steiker & Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out?] (noting that
“requiring a state that does not embrace the death penalty to execute certain
murderers . . . would clearly fail Eighth Amendment scrutiny because the Eighth
Amendment must also protect defendants against punishment not authorized by their
local communities”); cf. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (“[B]ecause of
the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually
represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts
should define criminal activity.”).
136
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY
42-44 (1993) (discussing crimes punishable by death in colonial America).
137
See supra note 4.
138
See Hugo Adam Bedau, The Death Penalty in America: Yesterday and
Today, 95 DICK. L. REV. 759, 768 (1991) (“Defenders of the death penalty insist that the
killings they favor are justified, desirable, legal, authorized—and therefore are
‘necessary.’ Besides, we are told, those who are condemned to die by the death penalty
are less than human.”); Robert A. Burt, Judges, Behavioral Scientists, and the
Demands of Humanity, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 191-92 (1994) (noting “our current
romantic obsession with the death penalty: the premise that criminal offenders are not
simply different from law-abiding citizens, but that they are so different as to stand
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It is not only the expression but also the experience of
condemnation that becomes more severe as fewer offenders
receive death sentences. Psychologists attribute this kind of
relative valuing of punishments to the process of social
comparison.139 Philosophers speak in terms of the comparative
nature of desert.140 Regardless of how it is explained, the
altogether outside the bounds of humanity”); cf. Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death,
1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305, 361 (“The overall goal of the defense is to present a human
narrative . . . so the jury will be less inclined to cast [the defendant] out of the human
circle.”).
Relatedly, because imposing the death penalty is the most severe
condemnation, a decision not to impose the death penalty may be interpreted as a
statement that the offender’s victims are not as valued as the victims of offenders who
have been sentenced to death. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 162 (1986) (“The victim’s mother cries out for
the murderer to be executed and is dissatisfied with any lesser penalty, precisely
because the death penalty is available as the most substantial response to willful
killing in the United States at this time. Because it is available, any lesser penalty
would depreciate the significance of the crime and would confer second-class status on
the life, and the circumstances of the death, of the victim.”); Randall L. Kennedy,
McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1388, 1391 (1988) (concluding that race-of-the-victim disparities in imposing the
death penalty “indicate a devaluation of black victims: put bluntly, officials in Georgia
place a higher value on the lives of whites than blacks” (internal punctuation omitted));
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Black Man’s Burden: Race and the Death Penalty in America,
81 OR. L. REV. 15, 32 (2002) (“Disproportionate application of the death penalty in cases
where the victim is white compared to cases where the victim is black reflect a
disturbing racial calculus: White lives are considered to be more valuable than black
lives, because the killing of a white is treated as a more serious crime—a crime worthy
of a more severe punishment—than the killing of a black.”).
139
See generally Leon Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Processes, 7
HUM. REL. 117 (1954) (proposing that one way that people assess their own abilities is
through comparisons to others); see also William Austin, Equity Theory and Social
Comparison Processes, in SOCIAL COMPARISON PROCESSES: THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 279, 279 (Jerry M. Suls & Richard L. Miller eds., 1977)
(“Philosophers and social scientists both seem to agree that social comparison processes
are indelibly linked with perceptions of ‘fairness,’ ‘justice,’ or ‘equity.’ Scholars agree
first that questions of fairness or justice inevitably arise from subjective, evaluative
judgments, and second that such judgments can occur only after an individual locates
himself within some frame of reference.” (citations omitted)). A related concept is
relative deprivation, which explains “the important observation that feelings of
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with one’s outcomes depend more on subjective
standards, such as the level of outcomes obtained by salient comparison persons, than
on objective prosperity.”
James M. Olson & J. Douglas Hazlewood, Relative
Deprivation and Social Comparison: An Integrative Perspective, in RELATIVE
DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL COMPARISON: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM, VOLUME 4, at 1, 2
(James M. Olson et al. eds., 1986); see also PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN
SOCIAL LIFE 158-60 (1964) (discussing the principles of relative gratification and
relative deprivation).
140
E.g., Shelly Kagan, Comparative Desert, in DESERT AND JUSTICE 93, 98
(Serena Olsaretti ed., 2003) (“[C]omparative desert demands that my level of wellbeing bear a certain relation to your level of well-being, where this precise relation is
itself a function of how our levels of virtue compare.”); Owen McLeod, On the
Comparative Element of Justice, in DESERT AND JUSTICE, supra, at 123, 144 (“[A]ny
total theory of justice will have to explain the fact that the justice of what you receive
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conclusion that the “desert-satisfying power” of a particular
punishment is relative or comparative is confirmed by a host of
everyday, real-world experiences.141 It is readily understood by,
for example, any student who after receiving a grade of “F” on a
test has wondered whether anyone else also received the same
grade.
A student who alone receives a failing grade
understands her performance on the test to have been
especially bad, whereas a student who fails along with the rest
of her class does not.
The comparative or relative value of grades, and by
extension of rewards and punishments more generally, is even
more apparent when the grades are assigned on a curve. If a
curve allows only three “A” grades but the best six exams are
essentially the same, the reward value of the “A” grades is
excessive—that is, the three students who receive the “A”
grades are being told that their work is better than the work of
all but two of their classmates when it really is only better than
all but five.142 Similarly, if a curve allows only three students to
receive “F” grades but the worst six exams are essentially the
same, then the punishment value of the “F” grades is
excessive—that is, assigning the “F” grades tells three students
that their work is worse than all but two of their classmates
when it really is only worse than all but five.
The categorical exclusions adopted in Atkins and Roper
act like a forced curve, allowing the death penalty to be
imposed in fewer cases than some legislatures had deemed
warranted. Prior to Atkins, twenty states had not excluded
mentally retarded offenders from capital punishment, the same
number that prior to Roper had allowed juveniles to be

can have something to do with how it compares to what others receive.”); Peter
Simpson, Book Review, NOTRE DAME PHIL. REVIEWS (Jul. 1, 2004), http://ndpr.nd.edu/
review.cfm?id=1451 (reviewing SERENA OLSARETTI, ED. DESERT AND JUSTICE (Oxford,
2003)) (arguing that “justice in distribution is secured if my share is related to my
desert as your share is related to your desert. Then I get absolutely what I deserve
because I get what I comparatively deserve.”).
141
McLeod, supra note 140, at 144. The examples presented here involving
grades are inspired by similar examples presented in, among others, McLeod, supra
note 140, and Nathanson, supra note 130.
142
This is the reverse of the problem of grade inflation, the problem that
awarding too many “A’s” diminishes the grade’s value. See Simpson, supra note 140.
(“[S]uppose an excellent student absolutely deserves an A but the professor gives
mediocre students As as well. Then, in this case, the A grade fails to be appropriate to
the excellent student’s desert since it fails to indicate his superiority over the mediocre
students.”). Awarding not enough “A’s” has the opposite effect, increasing the grade’s
value.
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sentenced to death.143 In these states, after Atkins and Roper,
the punitive value of the death penalty is enhanced for the nonjuvenile and non-mentally retarded offenders who remain
subject to this punishment.144
Moreover, had these legislatures known when they
enacted their death penalty statutes that the Supreme Court
would eventually rule that mentally retarded and juvenile
offenders could not be sentenced to death—that is, had the
legislatures known that only some of the offenders that they
considered worthy of capital punishment could receive this
punishment—the legislatures might have decided not to
sentence any offenders to death, or to sentence a different
Because the death penalty is
subset of offenders.145
qualitatively different from all other kinds of punishments,146
143

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 552 (2005). As the Court explained:

When Atkins was decided, 30 States prohibited the death penalty for the
mentally retarded. This number comprised 12 that had abandoned the death
penalty altogether, and 18 that maintained it but excluded the mentally
retarded from its reach. By a similar calculation in this case, 30 States
prohibit the juvenile death penalty, comprising 12 that have rejected the
death penalty altogether and 18 that maintain it but, by express provision or
judicial interpretation, exclude juveniles from its reach.
Id. at 564 (citation omitted).
144
See Andrew von Hirsch, Recent Trends in American Criminal Sentencing
Theory, 42 MD. L. REV. 6, 28 (1983) (“If A and B commit a given kind of crime under
circumstances suggesting similar culpability, they deserve similar punishments.
Imposing unequal punishments on them . . . unjustly treats one as though he were
more to blame for his conduct than the other.”); see also William S. Laufer & Nien-hê
Hsieh, Choosing Equal Injustice, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 343, 347-49 (2003) (arguing that
failing to punish some offenders has the effect of imposing on those who are punished
“a burden of relative disadvantage,” which causes them “to be punished more than they
deserve”).
145
Although it might seem unlikely at best that a legislature would be
motivated by concern for fairness to criminal defendants, such skepticism might reflect
an unduly pessimistic view of legislatures. As Professor Ronald Wright has argued in a
somewhat different context,
Such pessimism about legislatures in criminal justice . . . is overstated. The
facts on the ground tell us that legislatures sometimes vote for things that
benefit the defense even when courts interpreting the Constitution do not
demand them. For instance, states have long provided defense counsel in a
broader range of cases than the Constitution strictly requires. Given the
minimal levels of competence required to satisfy the Sixth Amendment and
due process guarantee of effective counsel, most states already fund their
systems at levels higher than the bare minimum that the Constitution would
tolerate.
Wright, supra note 2, at 254-55 (footnote omitted).
146
As the Supreme Court has stated:
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not
in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its
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the offenders who are sentenced to death must be qualitatively
different from all other people who commit crimes, even the
crime of murder.147 When deciding the statutory criteria that
define this category of “worst of the worst” offenses,
legislatures make assessments about which kinds of murders
are both similar to each other and different from other kinds of
murders. For example, a legislature might decide that the
murder of a child and the murder of a police officer are
sufficiently similar to each other—perhaps because both cause
a special kind of harm to society—and are also sufficiently
more harmful than other more ordinary murders to justify
capital punishment. The legislature is not deciding in an
abstract, Platonic Forms sense which murders are worthy of
capital punishment but is instead making relative assessments
about which murders are worse than all other murders;
therefore, excluding from capital punishment a certain subset
of offenders who murder children or police officers, as the Court
did in Atkins and Roper, challenges the legislature’s entire
assessment of which offenses merit the death penalty. Had
this legislature known that the Supreme Court would one day
prohibit sentencing to death any offender who, for example,
before his eighteenth birthday murdered a child or a police
officer, the legislature might have decided not to impose the
death penalty on any offenders who commit these offenses.
Executing non-juvenile and non-mentally retarded offenders
whose death sentences were imposed under statutes that had,
before Atkins and Roper, allowed juvenile or mentally retarded
offenders also to be sentenced to death presumes that the
legislatures that enacted those statutes would have believed
rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice.
And it is unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in
our concept of humanity.
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)); see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (stating that “the penalty of death is qualitatively
different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long”); cf. Nathanson, supra note
130, at 162 (“I conclude then that the argument from arbitrariness has special force
against the death penalty because of its extreme severity and its likely uselessness.
The arbitrariness of other punishments may be outweighed by their necessity, but the
same cannot be said for capital punishment.”).
147
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432 (1980) (reversing a death sentence
because “[t]he petitioner’s crimes cannot be said to have reflected a consciousness
materially more ‘depraved’ than that of any person guilty of murder”); Furman, 408
U.S. at 248 n.11 (Douglas, J., concurring) (requiring capital sentencing schemes to
provide a “meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death
penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not”).
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these non-juvenile and non-mentally retarded offenders to still
deserve the death penalty had it known that others it believed
to deserve the death penalty would be excluded from this
punishment. But this presumption might be wrong. Just as a
teacher might prefer to not fail anyone if she could not fail
everyone whom she believed to deserve to fail, a legislature
might have decided to not sentence any offenders to death if it
could not sentence to death all the offenders whom it believed
to deserve this punishment. And while students might not
have a legal right to the grade that their teacher thinks that
they deserve, criminal defendants do have a constitutional
right to a punishment that is not excessive—that is, to a
punishment that is not more severe than the punishment that
their legislature thinks that they deserve.148
II.

THE BIGGER PICTURE: SEEKING FAIRNESS AND
CONSISTENCY

A.

Inequalities Abound (But That’s No Excuse for Adding
More)

Categorical exclusions are, of course, not the only reason
that equally culpable offenders will sometimes receive
unequally severe punishments.149 Prosecutors’ decisions not to
seek the death penalty for reasons unrelated to culpability—
reasons such as the defendant’s agreement to plead guilty in
exchange for a lesser charge, or the wishes of the victim’s
family—likely account for most cases, certainly for more cases
than will the categorical exclusions adopted in Atkins or
Roper.150 But the fact that a variety of factors cause some
equally culpable offenders to receive unequally severe
punishments does not mean that the disparities that Atkins
148
See Steiker & Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out?, supra note 135, at 865
(noting that “the Eighth Amendment must also protect defendants against punishment
not authorized by their local communities” and that “a disassociation of individual
sentencing decisions from a state’s internal consensus regarding just punishment
would . . . violate the Eighth Amendment”).
149
See id. at 867 (noting that “vast arbitrariness exists in the operation of the
criminal justice system prior to sentencing—in the investigation of crime, the charging
decision, the plea offer (if any), the decision to seek the death penalty, and the
effectiveness of defendant’s counsel”).
150
Scott W. Howe, The Constitution and Capital Sentencing: Pursuing Justice
and Equality, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 749, 788 (1992) (stating that “if anything is clear
about the administration of the death penalty, it is that most death-eligible offenders
escape the death penalty through discretionary decisions made outside the sentencing
proceeding”).
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and Roper cause are not problematic. Indeed, a growing
number of commentators are arguing for increased honesty and
transparency in plea bargaining and other exercises of
prosecutorial discretion, so as to diminish disparities in
sentences among equally culpable offenders.151 While Atkins
and Roper might not create a huge number of additional
disparities, the desired trend is toward fewer rather than more
unequal sentences among equally culpable offenders.
Additionally, the potential for disparities increases as
courts consider calls to extend the “Atkins logic” to traits other
than mental ability and age. Many commentators have noted
that such characteristics as mental illness, alcohol and other
drug addictions, a history of childhood abuse, and an
impoverished background are especially prevalent among
death row inmates.152 All of these characteristics, like age and
mental ability, likely correlate with culpability. For example,
as the severity of a psychotic disorder or a substance abuse

151
As the Report of the Massachusetts Governor’s Council on Capital
Punishment stated:

[I]n the special context of the death penalty, it is essential to ensure that
local prosecutorial discretion is exercised in a reasonably rational and
consistent manner, so that—as much as humanly possible—like cases are
treated alike, and different cases are treated differently. This basic principle
was central to the U.S. Supreme Court’s modern constitutional mandate for
capital punishment, as expressed in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972),
and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and it remains a constitutional
requirement for all capital sentencing systems today.
Report of the Massachusetts Governor’s Council on Capital Punishment, 80 IND. L.J. 1,
12 (2005); see also Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff,
55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 109 (2002) (proposing that “hard” prosecutorial screening systems
can, among other benefits, diminish unequal treatment).
152
E.g., Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required:
Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751, 766 (2005) (noting
that capital defendants “very frequently are extremely intellectually limited, are
suffering from some form of mental illness, are in the powerful grip of a drug or alcohol
addiction, are survivors of childhood abuse, or are the victims of some sort of societal
deprivation (be it poverty, racism, poor education, inadequate health care, or some
noxious combination of the above)” (citing DOROTHY OTNOW LEWIS, GUILTY BY REASON
OF INSANITY: A PSYCHIATRIST EXPLORES THE MINDS OF KILLERS (1998) (documenting
the prevalence of organic mental defects and histories of childhood abuse among death
row inmates); Phyllis L. Crocker, Childhood Abuse and Adult Murder: Implications for
the Death Penalty, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1143, 1172-73 (1999) (documenting the prevalence
of histories of childhood abuse among murderers in general and capital defendants in
particular); Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and
the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 566, 585 (1995) (documenting the
prevalence of impoverished backgrounds and histories of drug or alcohol abuse among
death row inmates))).
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disorder increases, culpability tends to decrease.153 Someone
who was abused or neglected as a child is likely to be less
culpable for her actions than someone who enjoyed a wellcared-for childhood, in the same way that a juvenile or
mentally retarded offender is likely to be less culpable than a
non-juvenile or non-mentally retarded offender.154 As a result
of this similarity, treating these additional categories of
offenders differently from juvenile and mentally retarded
offenders with respect to eligibility for the death penalty might
be unjust, or—as one scholar has argued—might even be a
violation of equal protection.155 Several state court justices
have already expressed agreement with the argument that
Atkins should apply to mentally ill offenders.156 If these
additional characteristics, or any other imperfect correlates of
culpability, become grounds for additional categorical
exclusions, then an increasing number of offenders will become
ineligible for the death penalty not because they are in fact less
culpable but because they possess traits that make them likely
to be less culpable. Death sentences will then increasingly
become not so much pronouncements of actual culpability as
actuarial assessments of likely culpability.
It is possible to think that avoiding the risk that juries
will sentence to death some juvenile or mentally retarded
offenders who do not deserve this punishment justifies
whatever inequalities categorical exclusions might cause. The
Court itself suggested such a possibility in both Atkins and
153

See Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus,
and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1210 (2005) (suggesting that
“[a]n offender’s mental illness or addiction to drugs reduces his or her capacity to obey
the law, thus making the offender less blameworthy”).
154
Phyllis L. Crocker, Childhood Abuse and Adult Murder: Implications for
the Death Penalty, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1143, 1179 (1999) (“Psychological and medical
literature reveals how physical abuse as a child may have long-term negative
repercussions for the defendant’s ability to make appropriate judgments, to understand
the consequences of his actions, and to control his behavior.”); Paul Litton, The “Abuse
Excuse” in Capital Sentencing Trials: Is It Relevant to Responsibility, Punishment, or
Neither?, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1027, 1071 (2005) (“In recognizing that the death
penalty is not intended for all murder convicts, it is worth stressing that defendants
who suffered severe abuse and neglect were deprived of a safeguard in comparison to
others who were not treated as such.”).
155
Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People with Mental
Illness, 33 N.M. L. REV. 293, 294 (2003) (“The ultimate conclusion is that
distinguishing between people with significant mental illness, people with mental
retardation, and juveniles in the application of capital punishment violates the Equal
Protection Clause.”).
156
See, e.g., Corcoran v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495, 502-03 (Ind. 2002) (Rucker, J.,
dissenting); State v. Nelson, 803 A.2d 1, 48-49 (N.J. 2002) (Zazzali, J., concurring).
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Roper.157 But accepting categorical exclusions as risk-avoiding
measures does not make the consequences any less unjust for
those offenders who remain subject to the death penalty.158
Moreover, no evidence exists that mentally retarded or juvenile
offenders are especially likely to be wrongfully sentenced to
death. Indeed, the Court’s reliance on the “infrequent” and
“uncommon” executions of juvenile and mentally retarded
offenders to support its findings of a national consensus
against such sentences159 is inconsistent with its suggestion
that categorical exclusions are needed to address special risks
of wrongful death sentences.160
157

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572-73 (2005) (referring to the “risk [of]
allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient
culpability”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (“Mentally retarded
defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful execution.”).
158
The argument that fairness to those who remain subject to the death
penalty matters in evaluating the desirability of categorical exclusions is not meant to
suggest that the harms of erroneous exclusion are equal to the harms of erroneous
inclusion. But so long as the Supreme Court is willing to allow anyone to be sentenced
to death, death sentences should be as fair as possible. Fairness is diminished when
equally culpable offenders receive unequally severe sentences.
159
Roper, 543 U.S. at 553 (noting that “even in the 20 States without a formal
prohibition, the execution of juveniles is infrequent”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316
(observing that “even in those States that allow the execution of mentally retarded
offenders, the practice is uncommon”).
160
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 620-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that “the
Court itself acknowledges that the execution of under-18 offenders is ‘infrequent’ even
in the States ‘without a formal prohibition on executing juveniles,’ suggesting that
juries take seriously their responsibility to weigh youth as a mitigating factor” (citation
omitted)); cf. Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using
State Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1089,
1144 (2006) (“If the Court is correct that jurors are incapable of assessing whether the
death penalty may be applicable to juveniles and other categories of defendant, then
looking to how often juries apply the death penalty is entirely illogical.”).
The Court’s discussions of special risks also included the possibility that
some jurors might inappropriately consider evidence of an offender’s mental
retardation or youth as supporting an aggravating, rather than mitigating, factor.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 (“In some cases a defendant’s youth may even be counted
against him.”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (stating that “reliance on mental retardation as
a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that the
aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the jury”). The same is
also true, though, of many kinds of evidence that defendants commonly present to
sentencing juries. See John M. Fabian, Death Penalty Mitigation and the Role of the
Forensic Psychologist, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 73, 90 (2003) (“[M]ental illness,
substance abuse, and having a deprived and abusive childhood, factors that would
appear to be mitigating and arising sympathy, may be viewed as aggravating and
suggestive of future dangerousness.”); Welsh S. White, A Deadly Dilemma: Choices by
Attorneys Representing “Innocent” Capital Defendants, 102 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2035
(2004) (explaining that evidence of a defendant’s problems, such as mental illness or
childhood abuse, is “double-edged” because “while it does explain where the defendant
has come from and how he got to be the way he is, it also has the potential to not only
eliminate any lingering doubts jurors might have had as to the defendant’s guilt, but
also to strengthen their perception that sparing his life will enhance the danger to
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Another potential pragmatic argument in favor of
categorical exclusions is that they are a lesser of evils, or an
imperfect means justified by the desired ends of fewer
offenders who may be sentenced to death. The problem with
this argument, though, is that it is not possible to predict all of
the ends that Atkins and Roper will produce. Certainly, one
result is that some offenders who were sentenced to death will
not be executed.161 But the decisions likely will have other
effects as well. For example, because Atkins and Roper
proclaim to be making the death penalty more just, these
society, a consideration that empirical data indicate will weigh heavily in the penalty
jury’s decision”). The fact that evidence is “double-edged,” however, does not mean that
it useless to a defendant: “even double-edged mitigating evidence can be used to
present a powerful case for life by causing the jury to empathize with the defendant.”
White, supra, at 2036.
The Court further noted the possibility that mentally retarded offenders
are likely to confess falsely. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320 (noting “the possibility of false
confessions”). But this is a guilt-phase rather than sentencing-phase problem. Cf. id.
at 352 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We have never before held it to be cruel and unusual
punishment to impose a sentence in violation of some other constitutional
imperative.”). Moreover, recent research suggests that other characteristics—including
factual innocence—also lead to false confessions. Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of
Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents At Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCHOL. 215 (2005). Of
the 123 cases since 1973 that the Death Penalty Information Center identifies as
exonerations, four were juveniles and three were either diagnosed as mentally retarded
or had an IQ score suggestive of mental retardation. See Death Penalty Info. Ctr.,
Innocence: List of Those Freed from Death Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
article.php?scid=6&did=110 (last visited Jul. 5, 2006). And while it is impossible to
know the extent to which the age or mental ability of these seven defendants
contributed to their wrongful convictions, most of their trials were marred by the kinds
of misconduct that seem to be present in a great many wrongful conviction cases:
witnesses who committed perjury or prosecutors who suppressed or inappropriately
used evidence. Id.; see also Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous
Convictions Are Common in Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469, 481 (1996)
(discussing witness perjury and prosecutorial misconduct as sources of wrongful
convictions in capital cases).
161
These offenders include seventy one juveniles who were on death row as of
December 2004. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Juvenile Offenders Who Were on Death Row,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=204&scid=27#streibcaselist (last visited
Jul. 5, 2006). The number of offenders whose death sentences will be reversed because
of Atkins is still being sorted out, as courts hear claims of mental retardation. See
Nava Feldman, Annotation, Application of Constitutional Rule of Atkins v. Virginia
that Execution of Mentally Retarded Persons Constitutes “Cruel and Unusual
Punishment” in Violation of Eighth Amendment, 122 A.L.R.5th 145 (2004) (collecting
cases).
While considering the effects of the Court’s decisions on these individual
offenders is important, it is also important to consider the decisions’ wider effects. Cf.
Ogletree, supra note 138, at 34-35 (“As an abolitionist, I feel that we must constantly
be asking what the likely outcome will be from any arguments we raise against the
death penalty.”); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support
Legislative “Reform” of the Death Penalty?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 417, 431 (2002)
[hereinafter Steiker & Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support Legislative “Reform”]
(proposing that abolitionists “must have a long-term strategy that allocates some
resources toward current cases and some toward larger goals”).
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decisions risk diminishing opposition to the death penalty
among those who fear that it cannot be administered justly.162
Additionally, lawmakers who might have been willing to
support reforms that really could make the death penalty more
just—reforms such as increasing funding for defense counsel163
or eliminating death qualification of jurors at the guilt
stage164—might now be less inclined to support such proposals
given the possibility that the Supreme Court will take adoption
of such legislation as evidence of a national consensus and
declare that the Constitution makes the legislature’s decision
irreversible.165 Some evidence suggests that the Atkins decision
might have diminished legislative interest in reforming the
death penalty: in 2001, the year preceding the Atkins decision,
“lawmakers in nearly every state that retained the death
penalty sponsored a series of capital punishment-related bills
that have paved the way for unprecedented reform,”166 but since
2001, such legislative activity has been scarce.167 Of course,
162

See supra note 1.
See sources cited supra note 2.
164
See Erik Lillquist, Absolute Certainty and the Death Penalty, 42 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 45, 88 (2005) (noting a “robust scholarly consensus that death-qualification of
jurors lowers the effective standard of proof in capital cases”).
165
See Jacobi, supra note 160, at 1152 (arguing that “anti-death penalty
actions of Supreme Court Justices could result in higher rates of death penalty
legislation and executions, as states protect their policymaking powers. Thus the
feedback effects between courts and legislatures makes judicial reliance on state
legislation subjective and its effects unpredictable.”).
166
Death Penalty Info. Ctr., The Death Penalty in 2001: Year End Report 4,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/YearEndReport2001.pdf (Dec. 2001) (noting that
these measures included bans on executing mentally retarded offenders enacted in five
states, calls for a moratorium on executions in eighteen states, legislation providing
inmates with greater access to post-conviction DNA testing enacted in seventeen
states, and changes to provide better legal representation for indigent defendants
adopted in “many death penalty states”); see also Steiker & Steiker, Should
Abolitionists Support Legislative “Reform”, supra note 161, at 417-18 (discussing
legislative activity).
167
In each of the years from 2002 to 2005, only a handful of state legislatures
adopted death penalty reforms. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., The Death Penalty in 2005:
Year End Report 2, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/yearend05.pdf (Dec. 2005) (listing
as state developments that Illinois and New Jersey continued to ban executions, that
Kansas and New York failed to pass new death penalty legislation after those states’
highest courts overturned prior death penalty laws, that the New Mexico legislature
came close to voting to abolish the death penalty, that the Massachusetts legislature
voted against the governor’s proposed death penalty, and that California and North
Carolina appointed commissions to study the death penalty system); Death Penalty
Info.
Ctr.,
The
Death
Penalty
in
2004:
Year
End
Report
1-2,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DPICyer04.pdf (Dec. 2004) (reporting that New York’s
legislature did not enact new death penalty legislation to replace the death penalty
statute that the state’s highest court ruled unconstitutional, that California’s
legislature commissioned a study of that state’s death penalty, that Illinois continued
its moratorium, and that New Jersey halted executions over concerns about execution
163
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such a change in legislative activity is undoubtedly the result
of many factors, but the possibility that the Atkins decision is
one of those factors suggests that the evils of categorical
exclusions might, in the long run, not be lesser after all.168
B.

Categorical Exclusions and the Furman-Lockett
“Tension”

In Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court’s first real
foray into regulating the death penalty,169 the Court decreed
that this punishment must be administered either consistently
or not at all.170 Several years after Furman, the Court ruled in
methods); Death Penalty Info. Ctr., The Death Penalty in 2003: Year End Report 3,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/YER-03-F.pdf (Dec. 2003) (noting comprehensive
criminal justice reform adopted by the Illinois legislature and a vote by the North
Carolina senate in favor of a moratorium on executions); Death Penalty Info. Ctr., The
Death Penalty in 2002: Year End Report 4, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
yrendrpt02.pdf (Dec. 2002) (describing, in addition to reforms enacted to comply with
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Atkins v. Virginia and Ring v. Arizona, the
moratorium instituted in Maryland and the one continued in Illinois, Indiana’s law
prohibiting executions of offenders under 18, Pennsylvania’s law allowing postconviction DNA testing, and heightened requirements for trial attorneys in California
and Washington).
168
It might be easier to embrace categorical exclusions as a lesser evil but for
the availability of arguments against the death penalty that are not contingent upon
what evils actually result. Many writers, for example, have persuasively argued that
the basic problem with all capital sentencing is the impossibility of achieving
infallibility. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY
OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 96 (1974) (“Though the justice of God may indeed ordain that
some should die, the justice of man is altogether and always insufficient for saying who
these may be.”); see also Margaret Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving
Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989,
1064 (1978) (“If infallibility is to be required for any case, it should be required where
the deprivation is irrevocable; and if infallibility is to be required in any case in which
the deprivation is irrevocable, it should be required where the irrevocable deprivation
is of life itself.”).
169
See Carol S. Steiker, Remembering Race, Rape, and Capital Punishment,
83 VA. L. REV. 693, 704 (1997) (book review) (noting that “the Supreme Court first
‘constitutionalized’ death penalty law in Furman v. Georgia”); Note, Cruel and Unusual
Punishments in The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 76, 76 (1972) (“In
Furman v. Georgia the Supreme Court for the first time ruled directly on the
constitutionality of capital punishment under the cruel and unusual punishments
clause of the eighth amendment.” (footnote omitted)).
170
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that
the Eighth Amendment requires capital punishment to be applied consistently); see
also Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1147 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (“There is little doubt now that Furman’s essential holding was
correct. Although most of the public seems to desire, and the Constitution appears to
permit, the penalty of death, it surely is beyond dispute that if the death penalty
cannot be administered consistently and rationally, it may not be administered at
all.”); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) (referring to “the Court’s
insistence that capital punishment be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency,
or not at all”).
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Lockett v. Ohio that to ensure fairness to individual offenders,
capital sentencing juries must be allowed to consider a nearly
limitless171 range of reasons for not imposing the death
penalty.172 Many commentators have accused the Furman and
Lockett decisions of creating a “tension” between consistency
and fairness.173 The Supreme Court has, on occasion, expressed
the same idea.174 The root of the problem is that procedures
adopted to enhance one goal often have the unintended
consequence of diminishing the other. For example, since
171
Under Lockett, the jury must consider all relevant mitigating evidence.
What counts as relevant mitigating evidence is “evidence which tends logically to prove
or disprove some fact or circumstance which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to
have mitigating value.” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284-85 (2004) (quoting
McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 440 (1990) (internal citation omitted)). For an
argument that only culpability-related mitigating evidence is constitutionally required,
see Steiker & Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out?, supra note 135, at 840.
172
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer . . . not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and
any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death.”); see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304
(1976) (plurality opinion) (“[I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity
underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.”
(internal citation omitted)); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(“A jury must be allowed to consider on the basis of all relevant evidence not only why
a death sentence should be imposed, but also why it should not be imposed.”).
173
E.g., Vivian Berger, “Black Box Decisions” on Life or Death—If They’re
Arbitrary, Don’t Blame the Jury: A Reply to Judge Patrick Higginbotham, 41 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1067, 1080 (1991) (proposing that “the Court’s dual sentencing objectives
strongly resemble Siamese twins—locked at the hip but straining uncomfortably in
opposite directions”); Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons:
Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1155 (1980) (“Thus, if death as a
punishment requires both maximum flexibility and non-arbitrariness, and these
requirements cannot both be met (because flexibility and nonarbitrariness must vary
inversely), then death cannot be a permissible punishment.”); Scott E. Sundby, The
Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital
Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147, 1196 (1991) (referring to “the tension between
Furman’s call for guided discretion and Lockett’s requirement of unrestricted
presentation of relevant mitigating evidence”); see also Stephen P. Garvey, “As the
Gentle Rain from Heaven”: Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1001
(1996) (“Commentators have often remarked that Furman’s mandate of consistency
and Woodson’s mandate of individualization compete with one another at some level.”).
174
See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973 (1994) (“The objectives of
these two inquiries can be in some tension . . . .”); Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 6-7
(1994) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment’s concern that the death penalty be both appropriate
and not randomly imposed requires the States to perform two somewhat contradictory
tasks in order to impose the death penalty.”); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 182
(1988) (plurality opinion) (“Arguably these two lines of cases . . . are somewhat in
‘tension’ with each other.” (citation omitted)); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 544
(1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]ension . . . has long existed between the two
central principles [of consistency and individualized sentencing] of our Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence.”).
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Furman, one way that legislatures have attempted to narrow
the category of offenders who are eligible for the death penalty
is by enacting lists of statutory aggravating factors and
allowing juries to impose the death penalty only when one or
more of the factors on the list is present.175 The purpose of
limiting capital punishment to those cases in which one or
more aggravating factors is present is to achieve consistency
among those offenders who are sentenced to death.176 But
limiting capital punishment to crimes in which certain
statutory aggravating factors are present achieves consistency
without compromising individual fairness only if the list of
aggravating factors is neither under- nor over-inclusive.177
175
These aggravating factors must “reasonably justify the imposition of a
more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder” and
“genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.” Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983); see also Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428
(1980) (“[A State must] define the crimes for which death may be the sentence in a way
that obviates standardless sentencing discretion.” (alterations and internal quotations
omitted)).
176
“[S]tatutory aggravating circumstances play a constitutionally necessary
function at the stage of legislative definition: they circumscribe the class of persons
eligible for the death penalty.” Zant, 462 U.S. at 878.
177
This is arguably the most serious pragmatic problem with capital
punishment. Present statutes are undoubtedly over-inclusive. See sources cited supra
note 6. Legislatures might remedy this problem by limiting capital punishment to one
or two crimes for which there is broad agreement that if any crime justifies the death
penalty, it would be these. Two fairly obvious candidates for such crimes are the
murder of a child and the murder of more than one person. See Stephen P. Garvey,
Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1538, 1556 (1998) (“Murders involving child victims are highly aggravating, but
otherwise jurors claim that the victim’s status and standing make little difference.”);
David McCord, An Open Letter to Governor George Ryan Concerning How to Fix the
Death Penalty System, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 451, 455 (2001) (suggesting multiple victims
as an example of the worst kind of murder); Conference, The Death Penalty in the
Twenty-First Century, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 239, 345 (1995) (remarks of Diann RustTierney, Director of the ACLU Capital Punishment Project and Vice Chair of the
National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty) (same). But this approach raises the
problem of under-inclusiveness. The idea that legislatures are capable of constructing
a list of aggravating circumstances that will succeed both in making all offenders who
deserve the death penalty eligible for this punishment and in excluding all offenders
who do not deserve this punishment might be wishful thinking:

The response of the states to Furman was a valiant effort to introduce
evenhandedness where irregularity had prevailed. But the outcome has been
no more successful than that of the prior system of capital punishment. This
failure has not resulted from lack of effort but rather from the impossibility of
fashioning an acceptable method of administering capital punishment while
maintaining the system of rights that our Constitution mandates.
Jack Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 928 (1982); see
also Note, The Rhetoric of Difference and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1599, 1607 (2001) (“[T]he method of distinguishing the worst of the
worst is no more precise now than it was prior to Furman. The moral determination
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Otherwise, as Justice Blackmun suggested, “[a] step toward
consistency is a step away from fairness.”178
The procedural requirements of Lockett produce the
same kind of problem. The goal of allowing defendants to
present unlimited mitigation evidence is to ensure that a jury
will not impose a death sentence when a lesser sentence is
But allowing juries to consider unlimited
deserved.179
mitigation evidence—including evidence of factors not related
to culpability—invites its own inequalities.180 For example,
under Lockett, a jury could decide not to impose the death
penalty for such non-culpability-related reasons as sympathy
for the offender’s family or admiration for the offender’s
behavior in prison.181 Or the jury could make the opposite
decision, to impose the death penalty, for the opposite reasons:
lack of sympathy or admiration.182 Either way, the result is
diminished consistency, or unequal sentences for equal
culpability.
Given that requiring legislatures to specify aggravating
factors or to in some other way narrow the category of offenders
involved in this choice may render impossible a rational and precise description of the
types of defendants who should be put to death.”).
178
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1149 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari).
179
See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) (“By holding that the
sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor,
the rule in Lockett recognizes that a consistency produced by ignoring individual
differences is a false consistency.”); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (“[A]
statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent
mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant’s character and record and to
circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death
penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty.”).
180
Stephen R. McAllister, The Problem of Implementing a Constitutional
System of Capital Punishment, 43 KAN. L. REV. 1039, 1064 (1995) (“The notion of
guided discretion is destroyed and the goal of consistent results is unattainable if the
sentencer’s discretion is guided with respect to aggravating circumstances but
unlimited in granting mercy.”); Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts, supra note
3, at 384; see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 360 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“The decision whether to impose the death penalty is a
unitary one; unguided discretion not to impose is unguided discretion to impose as
well.”).
181
Susan R. Klein & Jordan M. Steiker, The Search for Equality in Criminal
Sentencing, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 266 (arguing that “the Court’s broad conception of
individualization—extending far beyond truly ‘mitigating’ factors (in terms of reducing
moral culpability)—prevents states from developing any consistent theory of the goal or
goals behind their capital statute; a defendant must be free to argue against the death
penalty on the basis of any plausibly relevant consideration, including evidence of
familial sympathy, good character traits, and future good behavior”).
182
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987) (observing that “the power to
be lenient [also] is the power to discriminate” (quoting K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE 170 (1973))).
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who can receive a death sentence promotes consistency but
jeopardizes fairness, and that prohibiting legislatures from
limiting mitigation evidence promotes fairness but jeopardizes
consistency, it might be tempting to conclude that one of these
rules must go. This would not be a novel conclusion; Justice
Scalia, for one, has stated that because Lockett and Furman
are “rationally irreconcilable,” and because Furman is
connected less tangentially than Lockett to the original
meaning of the Eighth Amendment, he will “not vote to uphold
an Eighth Amendment claim that the sentencer’s discretion
has been unlawfully restricted.”183
Such a solution, however, fails to solve the problem,
because consistency requires fairness. If a particular offender’s
culpability is inaccurately determined, then not only will his
sentence be unfair but consistency also will be diminished. The
death sentence of an offender who deserves a sentence of a
term of imprisonment is unjust in two ways: it is unfair to him
in an absolute, noncomparative sense because it is not
commensurate with the wrongfulness of his acts and his
culpability for those acts, and it is also inconsistent because it
is more severe than the sentences received by offenders who
neither are less culpable nor committed less wrongful acts.
The same is true if the offender receives a sentence of a term of
imprisonment when he deserves to be sentenced to death. His
sentence is unfair (to others if not to the offender himself)184
183
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 673 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); see
also Callins, 510 U.S. at 1141-42 (Scalia, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (“[T]his
Court has attached to the imposition of the death penalty two quite incompatible sets
of commands: The sentencer’s discretion to impose death must be closely confined, but
the sentencer’s discretion not to impose death (to extend mercy) must be unlimited.”
(citations omitted)).
184
Some scholars have proposed that an unfairly lenient sentence is a wrong
against the offender, who has a “right to punishment.” See Lloyd L. Weinreb, The
Complete Idea of Justice, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 752, 758 n.14 (1984) (“Hegel, emphasizing
that punishment responds to the aspect of wrongdoing, said that ‘punishment is
regarded as containing the criminal’s right and hence by being punished he is
honoured as a rational being.’” (quoting G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 71 (T. Knox
trans. 1942))).
Here, “unfair” is used to mean “undeserved.” The wrong created by
imposing an unfairly lenient sentence is experienced if not by the offender himself then
at least by others whose sentences are not so lenient. See Richard S. Frase,
Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 74 (2005) (“[U]niformity is based on
concepts of fairness—fairness to other offenders (who could justly complain if this
defendant received a lighter penalty for the same conduct), and fairness to the
defendant (who could justly complain if he were punished more severely than other
equally blameworthy offenders).”). But see Scott W. Howe, The Failed Case for Eighth
Amendment Regulation of the Capital-Sentencing Trial, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 825
(1998) (stating that this idea suffers from “profound irony”). Recently, the topic of
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because it is less severe than he deserves, and it is inconsistent
with the more severe sentences received by other offenders who
are equally culpable. Consistency and fairness thus both
require the same thing—that all offenders receive sentences
that are neither more nor less severe than they deserve.185
If the exclusions adopted in Atkins and Roper really did,
as the Court conveyed, affect only those offenders who are less
culpable than other offenders, then these decisions would
promote both consistency and fairness. But to the extent that
Atkins and Roper exclude some offenders who are not
necessarily less culpable than those offenders who remain
included, these decisions advance neither of capital
punishment’s sentencing goals. Moreover, by failing to address
the inequalities that Atkins and Roper might cause, the Court
created an impression that the exclusions will only enhance
fairness and consistency—an impression that may provide false
comfort to those who do not oppose the death penalty in all
instances but who nevertheless do care that this punishment is
administered justly.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s contentions in Atkins
and Roper, juvenile and mentally retarded offenders are not
necessarily less culpable for their crimes than are non-juvenile
and non-mentally retarded offenders. Because juvenile and
mentally retarded offenders are not necessarily less culpable,
unfair leniency has been addressed in the context of considering whether mercy is
consistent with fairness. See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out?, supra
note 135, at 864 (observing that “[d]iscrimination in the dispensation of mercy and
discrimination in the imposition of death create exactly the same inequality problem in
any given pool”). Although mercy creates problems for consistency, it is worth noting
that some clemency decisions enhance consistency. For cases in which a clemency
decision enhanced consistency, see Louis D. Bilonis, Legitimating Death, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 1643, 1701 (1993) (“Ex-Marine Harold Glenn Williams’ death sentence was
commuted by the Board due to concerns about the proportionality of the sentence. A
codefendant who entered a plea agreement received only a ten-year sentence, despite
having been the ‘ringleader’ of the murder.”); Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy
Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 627 (1991)
(“I am impelled to commute the sentence of Ames to the same sentence received by his
cohort not for any sympathy for Ames, but in order that it may not be said that Ohio
failed in comparative justice.” (quoting former Ohio governor Thomas Herbert)).
185
Stephen P. Garvey, Is It Wrong To Commute Death Row? Retribution,
Atonement, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1319, 1330 (2004) (“Like cases must be treated
alike. Justice and equality therefore work together. If an offender receives the
punishment he deserves, and if all those similarly situated receive the punishment
they deserve, then each offender will not only have been treated justly, he will also
have been treated equally compared to all those similarly situated.”).
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categorically excluding them from capital punishment results
in unjust treatment for similarly culpable non-juvenile and
non-mentally retarded offenders.
In Roper, the Supreme Court observed that “[b]ecause
the death penalty is the most severe punishment, the Eighth
Amendment applies to it with special force.”186 The Court in
both Roper and Atkins seems to have forgotten, however, about
the Eighth Amendment rights of those who are still subject to
the death penalty, and also about its own prior commitment to
the Eighth Amendment principle that capital punishment must
be imposed fairly and consistently or not at all.187 The
categorical exclusions adopted in Atkins and Roper make it
easier to believe that the death penalty can indeed be imposed
justly, but the real result of these decisions might well be that
capital punishment is both less fair and less consistent.188

186

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
See cases cited supra note 179.
188
The possibility that increased constraints on imposing the death penalty
will make capital punishment only seem more fair has been suggested by many
scholars. See, e.g., Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A Functional Critique and
Proposed Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 77
(2002) (“Is not there a risk that these reforms may lead to the worst of all worlds: the
appearance of careful and fair review coupled with the practical certainty that relief
will be denied each time? This ‘legitimation effect’ is one of the most damaging aspects
of the current death penalty review scheme.”); Joshua Herman, Comment, Death
Denies Due Process: Evaluating Due Process Challenges to the Federal Death Penalty
Act, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1777, 1889 (2004) (“If the general population is induced into
believing that the capital punishment system is reliable because of legitimating
reforms, wrongful capital convictions will continue to mount and the risks of wrongful
convictions and executions will not subside.”); Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second
Thoughts, supra note 3, at 436 (“[T]he elaborateness of the Court’s death penalty
jurisprudence fuels the public’s impression that any death sentences that are imposed
and finally upheld are the product of a rigorous—indeed, too rigorous—system of
constraints.”); Scott E. Sundby, The Death Penalty’s Future: Charting the Crosscurrents
of Declining Death Sentences and the McVeigh Factor, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1963
(2006) (noting the risk that after Atkins and Roper, “the public may feel that the most
unfair applications of the death penalty have been banished without realizing that
more subtle but every bit as deadly problems can still persist” (footnote omitted)).
187

